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Implementation  of the North American  Free Trade Agreement
(NAFrA)  will  generate  substantial  efficiency  gains  forMexico'  s
financial  system  and  economy.  The key to NAFTA's  success  in
the financial  sector will be effective  prudential  regulation  and
supervision. But Mexican financial institutions will need a
reasonable  transition  period to modernize  operations  and  rise to
the challenge  of their Canadian  and U.S. counterparts.
Pblicy Research Working Papers  disserinate  the findings ofwork in progress  and  encourage the exchange of ideas arnongBank  staffand
A othersintewtedindevelopmntissues  lhesepapes  distributedbytheReseArchAdvi5o1yStaff. carrythenamesoftheauthor.  rflect
onlyytheirviews,  andshouldbeusedand  citedaccordingly.  Thefindings.intprpeuations.  andconclusions  amtheauthols'own.  Theyshould

















































































































nonc8a Sector  Development
WPS 1153
This paper-a  product of the Financial Sector Development Department -- is based on a report produced
for the Mexican authorities in  March 1991.  It updates the earlier report in relevant areas. Copies of this paper
are available free from the Wor.d Bank, 1818  1I Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Priscilla
Infante, room N9-003, extension 37664 (July 1993, 58 pages).
To maximize the efficiency gains from NAFTA,  supervision - particularly because of the heavy
the regulatory environment for Mexican banking,  financial pressures on the newly privatized banks
insurance, and securities markets should be  and the financial groups that own them. Without
further harmonized with those of the more  effective supervision, the new owners of the
advanced and efficient Canadian and U.S.  banks may take excessive risks to recoup the
markets.  substantial clement of goodwill in the
privatization price, before the protection from
Musalem, Vitwas,  and Demirg(ic-Kunt argue  foreign competition and new entrants is phased
that a prerequisite for NAFTA's  success is to  out.
remove regulatory distortions and to eliminate
opportunities for -egulatory arbitrage. Moreover,  An integrated market will presuppose greater
eliminating or reducing disparities between the  cooperation and informnation  exchange among
NAFIA  countries' tax rates and ways of levying  the national regulatory authorities to ensure, for
taxes would help prevent distortions, tax evasion,  instance, that weak banks do not undermine
and tax avoidance.  credit standards and that weak insurers do not
offer deceptively low-priced policies. In these
Complete harmonization may not be feasible  areas, Mexico needs intensive training and
or even desirable, given the way the three  cooperation with the Canadian and U.S. regula-
countries'  financial systems have evolved and  tory authorities.
the differences between their industrial structures
and stages of economic development.  To increase the contestability of the financial
markets and benefit from the transfer of financial
In banking, insurance, and securities mar-  technology, the Mexican financial system should
kets, the main free trade issues are the conver-  be opened to foreign entry. But Mexico needs to
gence of authorization criteria and the removal  modemize its financial institutions and Musalem,
of most of the obstacles to freedom of establish-  Vittas, and Demirgu,c-Kunt conclude that the
ment. It is also important to harmonize guarantee  proposed NAFTA should allow for a gradual
schemes and to create well-defined Mexican  approach to foreign entry. A reasonable transi-
schemes to protect small, unsophisticated  tion period, extending up to the year 2000, will
investors rather than mismanaged institutions.  give Mexican institutions ample time to achieve
The key to NAFrA's  success in the financial  the efficiency gains that motivated the quest for
sector will be effective prudential regulation and  the agreement in the first place.
|The  Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series  dissedinates  the  fidings of work  under  way  in the  Bank.rnobjective of the series
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Notes  561.  INTRODUCTION'
If  everything  goes  well,  a  North  and the possible reform of deposit insurance.
American  free  trade  agreement  (NAFTA)  Canada has gone a long way towards domestic
between Canada, Mexico  and the United States  deregulation,  having  authorized  universal
will become effective in January 1994.2 The  banking and financial conglomerates.  These
primary objective of NAFTA will be to reduce  issues  may raise important  questions  concerning
ye,t further any remaining tariffs collected on  efficiency, transitional arrangements and  the
cross-border  trade  within  North  America,  pace  of  integration.  This  paper  aims  at
allowing  each  country  to  concentrate  its  identifying  regulatory and tax issues that may
production  more in those sectors in which it has  constrain Mexico from deriving the maximum
a comparative  advantage. In addition, NAFTA  benefits from the implementation  of NAFTA.
will  likely  reduce  regulations  currently
restricting the degree to which firms can shift  The paper analyzes the implications of
their operations across borders, allowing  firms  NAFTA for the Mexican financial sector from
to take better advantage  of economies  of scale  differences  in sector development,  in regulations
and scope.  on banking, insurance  and securities  markets, in
constraints to capital mobility involving direct
One sector that has been of particular  foreign investment  (DFI) regulations  and in the
concern in  NAFTA negotiations is  financial  tax treatment  of financial  assets. It is organized
services.  While the financial sector in Mexico  in seven sections. The next section provides a
is still developing to attain the most advanced  brief sector background  and discusses  the .iain
international standards  of  efficiency, it  has  issues  involved  in  free  trade  in  finan^ial
reached  maturity  in  the  United States and  services. Sections  3, 4 and 5 focus on subsector
Canada  a long time ago.  However,  the finar.ial  issues  involving  banking,  insurance  and
systems  of  all  three  countries  have  been  securities markets.  In  each  case,  existing
undergoing fundamental change.  Mexico has  regulations  are  compared  and  contrasted,
recently  dealt  with  the  privatization  of  transitional  problems  are  discussed,  and
commercial banks,  the  restructuring of  the  recommendations  are made. Section  6 analyzes
development  banking sector, the promotion of  issues  arising from differences  in tax treatment.
contractual savings institutions, and the review  The last section provides a brief summary and
of  regulation  and  supervision  of  financial  conclusions. Appendix  A reviews the treatment
intermediaries. In the United States there are  of financial services in free trade negotiations,
the  problems of  regulation of  banking and  while Appendix B summarizes the provisions
insurance at the state level and restrictions on  covering financial services in  the  proposed
universal  banking  activities,  and  also  the  NAFTA that was signed in December 1992.
problems  with the Savings  and Loan insolvencies
1II.  ISSUES IN FREE TRADE IN FINANCIAL SERVICES
The  Mexican financial services sector  assets, cross-border after tax deposit rates are
(including  commercial  banks,  development  equalized  on equally liquid and risky securities.
banks, securities markets, and insurance) still  On the other hand, not all Mexican firms can
represents a  comparatively small fraction of  issue international  tradeable liabilities.  Those
aggregate output (3.5% of GDP compared to  that  can  are  able  to  consider  international
6.5%  in  the  European  Community, EC),  ;ending rates as their opportunity  cost of capital;
numbers employed (1.5% of total employment  but Mexican  firms which do not have the same
versus 3% in  the EC),  and compensation  of  access to  international financial markets will
employees (5.5% of total compensation  versus  bear the full cost of domestic intermediation.
6.2%  in the EC).  These figures suggest that  This implies that competitiveness  in the goods
compensation  is rather excessive  in Mexico. In  markets for the second group of firms will be
1989, M3 represented  79% of GDP in the USA,  negatively affected if prevailing conditions in
71%  in  Canada and only  29%  in  Mexico.  financial markets generate intermediation  cests
Hence, by  increasing income, and improving  that are over and above international  standards.
income  distribution  and  sector  efficiency,  Moreover, for those firms that rely on domestic
NAFTA will pave the path for an increased  role  intermediation  the ef.-ects  on production costs
of financial services  in Mexico's GDP.  will not be uniform, thosc that are relatively
financial  services intensive will suffer the most.
Flnancial Market Integration: The Efficiency-
Ownership Trade-off  NAFTA  will bring additional  pressure to
improve  efficiency  due to increased  cross border
Efficiency.  By  integrating financial  competition  and  easing  of  entry  barriers.
markets  across North  American  borders  NAFTA  Foreign banks and non-banks regularly operate
is likely to have a particularly important  impact  and compete informally in Mexico's financial
on efficiency. It will not only have significant  markets.  Also Mexican depositors, investors,
effects on the efficiency  of the sector itself but  insured (mainly life and health) and borrowers
also on the efficiency  of resource allocation  in  widely use  foreign  financial intermediaries.
sectors using financial markets. 3 In addition,  Therefore, opening  up the sector would  provide
NAFTA will influence macroeconomic  policy  greater scope for domestic  intermediation,  since
management, especially if  it were to  include  regulato-s  have virtually no control over either
exchange  rate commitments. Because  financial  foreign  entitic; or Mexican  residents  performing
services are inputs in the production  of goods,'  cross border financial  transactions. In addition,
estimation  of the effects  of NAFTA  on financial  it would offer greater protection to  investors,
services should take into account  economy  wide  would add competitiveness  to the economy as a
effects  rather than  just following  a narrow sector  whole, and should increase financial  deepening.
focus.  Therefore,  some  degree  of
synchronization  in the pace of integration  among  The main benefits  of foreign participation
participating  markets will be required.  are the increase in competition and efficiency,
the  transfer  of  technology  and  skilled
An  inefficient financial sector will not  management,  the introduction  of new products
only increase production  cost to final users, but  and services, the employment  and training of
it  will  also  induce subop'imal use  of  these  local staff, and greater access to  international
services in  the production of final goods or  markets.  These are likely to  bring  about a
services.  Since Mexican financial assets are  higher quality of service and a lower level of
near  perfect  substitutes with  U.S.  financial  prices.
2Ownership. In the financial  services  area,  Foreign institutions  would tend to retreat from a
although  the benefits  of privatization  have  gained  local market in response to two separate events:
wide  acceptanc-,  the  authorities  of  most  when they faced problems in the local market
countries, both developed and developing, are  (for instance  foreign instituti3ns  could  pull back
reluctant to  see  their  banking and  financial  operations from  a  local  market  facing  an
systems  dominated  by  foreign  institutions.  economic slowdown) and  when  they faced
Thus, even if they allow DFI in the financial  problems  in  their  home  market.  Local
system,  most  countries  impose  explicit  or  institutions  faced with difficulties in their home
implicit  limits  on the level and scope of activities  market cannot retreat from that market, unless
of foreign institutions.  the difficulties  are so serious  that they are forced
to go out of business. The impact  of a pullout
One of the key questions regarding the  would be  larger the  greater the  share  of  a
liberalization of  DFi  in  financial services is  national  market held by foreign institutions.
whether national authorities  are justified to be
worried about the ownership and  control of  Moreover,  the  authorities  of  many
financial  institutions. Unfortunately,  mainstream  countries claim that foreign institutions often
economic  theory  highlights  the  gains  in  confine  themselves  to serving  the most  profitable
efficiency and welfare that may result from  segments  of the market (cream skimming) and
greater competition  but has little to say on the  capturing economic  rents that may result from
distribution  of these gains and on the importance  existing  regulations  or  the  inefficiency of
of ownership  and control issues.  domestic  institutions. Foreign institutions  fail to
lower prices, although they may provide more
An important concern in many countries  efficient services and they also fail to  extend
is the fear that foreign institutions  may acquire  their services to  the  retail segments of  the
dominant  positions  in domestic  markets  and may  market.  In addition, foreign institutions may
drive out of business local institutions that are  stimulate capital  flight  and  thus  aggravate
less  efficient  and  have  fewer  capital  and  pressures on  the  exchange rate  at  times of
management  resources.  Restrictions  on foreign  external crisis.
entry are often justified on  "infant industry"
arguments.  A related criticism is that foreign  The experience  of foreign institutions in
institutions will not provide services to  local  different countries is  not  well  documented.
firms.  Although local  institutions may  be  Anecdotal evidence from  various  countries
created  to fill such a gap, this argument  implies  suggests that  foreign  institutions, especially
that such institutions  will not be able to survive  foreign  banks,  have  been  instrumental in
either because they will be taken over by the  enhancing the quality and lowering the cost of
large  and  capital-rich foreign institutions or  services to  large corporations, particularly in
because  they will be prevented  from achieving  a  countries  where the latter have  been discouraged
minimum  combination  of economies  of scale and  by restrictions  on cross-border  transactions  from
scope  by the foreign  domination  of the wholesale  accessing the international markets.  Foreign
and international  segments  of the market.  institutions have played an  important role  in
stimulating  product innovation  and introducing
A  parallel  argument  against allowing  new  types of  services, such  as  leasing and
foreign institutions to dominate local markets  factoring.  They have also  contributed to  a
relates to the strength  of their local commitment.  reversal of the brain drain by attracting foreign-
If institutions  are assumed  to retreat from distant  educated  nationals  and  have  trained  local
markets when they are faced with difict.  Jies,  executives  who  have  later  assumed  the
then their level of commitment  to local .a  management  of domestic institutions.
would be lower than that of local institutions.
3In  most  countries,  however,  foreign  As  regards  their  alleged  role  in
institutions  have not extended their services to  stimulating capital flight,  the role of  foreign
the retail segments of the market.  The main  institutions is  little  different  from  that  of
factors explaining  this reticence have been the  domestic institutions  in countries with an open
imposition of restrictive regulations, the high  e.-ital  account.  Both  have  the  means to
cost  of  entry,  and  political  sensitivity  to  facilitate  capital  flight  if  there  are  strong
domestic concerns about acquiring an unduly  incentives to  do  so (e.g.,  expectations of an
large  share  of  domestic  business.  Many  imminent  devaluation, unfavorabie interest rate
countries  criticize  foreign institu.ions  for failing  differential, political instability).  In countries
to extend their services to retail customers, but  with a closed  capital  account, foreign institutions
the fact is that if they did, foreign institutions  may contribute to  capital flight by  providing
would be criticized even more for acquiring a  contacts to their parent institutions in foreign
dominant position in  the  domestic financial  financial  centers  and by facilitating  arrangements
system.  for the maintenance  of bank accounts and other
investments  in overseas markets.  But even in
Another  important  factor that may  explain  such countries,  the main reascn for capital  flight
the failure of foreign institutions  to s.erve  small  is the pursuit of unsustainable  financial  policies
firms and the consumer  market may be the high  and  adverss political etvironment.  Foreign
information  cests  that  characterize  retail  institutions  may exacerbate  but they  do not cause
operations.  Foreign institutions may have a  the fligh. of capital.  Even in the absence of
comparative  advantage  over domestic  institutions  foreign institnions, capital controls have to be
in  providing  financial  services  to  large  particularly  effective  and watertight  to prevent a
corporations and  wealthy individuals but  the  flight of  capital in  the  presence of  adverse
reverse is likely to be the case in dealing with  macroeconomic  conditions.  Experience in this
small  and  medium-size  firms  and  retail  area indicates  that controls on capital mobility
consumers.'  Thus,  the  alleged tendency of  have been quite ineffective.
foreign  institutions  to  specialize  in  some
segments of the market may b  explained by  Finally, as regards the question of local
regulatory  and economic  factors.  commitment, there  is  no  empirical  study
documenting the  response  of  international
The criticism that they engage in cream  financial  institutions  to difficulties  in their home
skimming is  based  on  the  observation that  and  foreign  markets.  Both  the  extensive
foreign institutions  often  report high profits from  retrenchment  of American  banks from European
their local operations.  This  may, however,  and Asian markets in the late  1980s and the
reflect  their  higher  efficiency compared to  behavior of Japanese  banks in the eurocurrency
domestic  institutions.  In  countries  where  markets  over the 1970s  and 1980s  provide  some
domestic institutions  have been able to respond  support  to this argument. The risk for a national
to their challenge,  foreign institutions  have been  system that is dominated  by foreign institutions
unable to build a significant  market share in any  is  that  it  might  be  susceptible to  greater
segment of the market, while their profits on  instability  than  a  system  where  national
even the most wholesale  or specialized  types of  institutions  are the dominant  players.
operations have been low.  The profitability  of
foreign institutions depends very much on the  Efficiency/Ownership  Trade-off.
ability  of domestic  institutions  to modernize  their  Maximizing  the benefits  of free entry of foreign
operations and meet the challenge of increased  institutions  requires  the deregulation  of domestic
competition.  financial  institutions and  markets  and  the
establishment of  a  competitive environment.
Artificially low interest rates,  directed credit
4programs,  barriers  to  entry,  a&d  other  coordinat,  4 effort in freeing capital movements
in pediments  make  it  likely  that  foreign  and financial  services. Moreover, while capital
iLa.titutions  will simply capture regulatory rents  mobility  and  freedom  to  provide  financial
rather than promote competition  and efficiency.  services  might both be integral  parts of the long
Foreign participation  may be beneficial even if  run objective  of the FTA, there does not seem to
markets are  not  fully  liberalized but  some  be an operational  plan for integrating  monetary
restrictions  may be necessary  to grant domestic  policy.
institutions enough time to  adjust to the new
environment, modernize their  operations and  Monetar  and Exchange Rate Policie,
meet the challenge  of their foreign competitors.  The theory of optimal currency areas indicates
t5iat  a fixed exchange rate system - implying a
Because of  their location, cross-border  passive monetary policy  - is  the  preferred
financial transactions between Mexico and the  solution for  an  FTA with  a  high  degree of
U.S.  and possibly Canada are already quite  economic and financial integration and perfect
integrated.  The  capital  flight argument is,  mobility of  factors of  production.  On  the
therefore, less inportant for the North American  contrary, in a situation  where  there is immobility
market case.  Local market comm;.ment may  of labor across borders, as it may happen  urder
still be an issue, and the Mexican authorities  NAFTA, the same theory suggests a  flexible
may  have  to  assess  the  trade-off  between  foreign exchange rate  system,  which  would
efficiency and ownership.  enable the government to  pursue employ'nent
objectives  through  active  monetary  policy.
Components  of Financial  Integration  Hence, the  Mexican authorities will have to
decide on maintaining the existing generalized
Finamcial  integration  involves  three  fixed exchange  rate system or to adopt  a flexible
distinct but interrelated components:  monetary  exchange  rate system as Canada has.  These are
and exchange rate policies, capital movements  very complex  issues  that are beyond the scope of
and financial services.  Capital movements  and  this  paper,  although they  will  need  to  be
financial services  can  hardly  be  conceived  addressed  in the context  of NAFTA. Moreover,
independently: without capital  mobility, the  other  objectives  such  as  stabilization and
placing power of financial intermediaries  has  credibility may overrule the optimal currency
limited scope; conversely, regulatory barriers  areas policy suggestions.
that prevent operators  from supplying  services  to
non-residents threaten  to  undermine  capital  Capital  Movements  under  NAFTA.
mobility  itself.  Issues in the liberalization  of capital movements
within an FTA may require a review of DFI
In turn, capital movements  and financial  regulations. FTA should  reduce the screening  of
services forge a direct link between  the balance  foreign  investments by  member  countries,
of  payments and  domestic monetary policy.  eliminate  most  trade-distorting performance
Capital moves across borders in response to  requirements,  and  provide  security  and
changing  (after  tax risk-adjusted)  rates of return.  guarantees for investors in member countries.
Equilibrium is maintained  through variatiors in  Investors are assured that new discriminatory
exchange  rates  or  adjustments  in  relative  barriers to  investment  will not be erected and
monetary aggregates.  Therefore, full capital  that the rules of the game will not be changed
mobility under a fixed exchange rate system is  unfairly.  In short an FTA provides a business
only consistent  with passive monetary policy.  environment  conducive  to further investment  and
free trade.
The  linkages  between  the  three
components  underscore  the  need  for  a
5The US has traditionally held the first  Sector  deregulations  also facilitated  DFI.
rank among  countries investing  in Mexico ,65%  New Implementing  Rules issued  for mining and
of  the  accumulated total  DFI  into  Mexico  technology  transfer, new Decrees for auto-parts
originates in  the US,  a  value of  about $15  and  petrochemicals,  and  new  rules  for
billion) while Canada has held an insignificant  pharmaceuticals  and microcomputers, have all
proportion  of total DFI in Mexico (1.5% or an  opened up  DFI  in  a  signiflcant way.  New
accumulated  value of about  $300 million).  financial  sector laws passed in mid 1990  opened
up the sector to DFI.  Banks, brokerage  houses,
NAFTA  could  build  on  Mexico's  and insurance  houses are allowed to have up to
substantial  liberalization  of its treatment of DFI  30% foreign ownership. 6 In addition, DFI in
but it would have to  incorporate  the principles  trust funds is unlimited  but these investments  do
developed in the US-Canada  FTA's investment  not provide control.
chapter. The Reglamento  (Implementing  Rules)
to the DFI Law pa-ssed  in mid 1989 contains  Under NAFTA, national  treatment would
measures: (i)  allowing automatic 100% DFI  grant expanded access to  US  and  Canadian
participation  in activities  comprising  about  60%  investors to  all  sectors  where  the  Mexican
of GDP and only requiring the registration  of  private  sector is  allowed to  operate.  Also
the investment with tne National Registrar for  performance  indicators  and  investment
Foreign  Investment  (NRFI)  (this  procedure  conditionalities  may have to  be  relinquished.
applies if  minimum requirements concerning  Under NAFTA, investors  from partner countries
exports, regional development,  technology and  would be treated equally as domestic investors.
investment  size  are  met);  (ii)  increasing  Also, national  treatment  may require  phasing out
participation  of the private sector (domestic  and  screening  of investment  originated  from member
foreign)  in areas subject  to specific  regimes; (iii)  countries. Finally, Mexico  would need  to adjust
increasing transparency and speed of decision  portfolio  investment  in  listed  securities
making  by the National Commission  for Foreign  originated  from  the  US  and  Canada  to
Investment (NCFI); and  (iv) simplifying and  incorporate  national  treatment. However, some
deregulating registration  procedures  in  the  exceptions might  be  granted  for  strategic,
NRFI.  political,  environmental or  cultural  reasons;
while many  cases may be subject to a phase-out
While  the  Law  defines the  activities  strategy  given  the  disparities  in  economic
reserved for the Government  and for Mexican  development  of  the  associating  country
investors and  maximum DFI  participation in  members.
petrochemicals, auto-parts  and  mining,  the
Reglamento  clearly defines concepts that were  Any foreign investors  in Mexico  will also
rather  obscure  in  the  Law.  These reduce  have to forecast carefully the risk they face of
discretionality  and define precisely  the scope of  future adverse policy changes, i.e.,  political
DFI.  This goes a long way towards eliminating  risks. The nationalizations  of the banks in 1982,
the case by case approach  to DFI approval and  as  well  as  Mexico's  restructuring  of  its
registration  in a significant  number  of activities.  international debt,  are  both  recent  events,
Another objective of the  Reglamento was to  forcing  investors  to  take  these  risks  very
simplify procedures for those cases for which  seriously.  In  general,  investors will  enter
authorization  is still required. The time elapsed  Mexico  only if they can earn an after-tax  rate of
between application, approval and registration  return as high as they can get elsewhere. To the
was reduced from about l  1/2 years, before, to  extent the existing  policy regime leads investors
about 2 months now.  Therefore, for the first  to rationally anticipate  some chance of adverse
time clear, transparent and automatic  rules have  policy changes,  foreign (and Mexican)  investors
been established.  will cut back their investments  in Me.ico until
6the ex ante return is again comparable to that  measures that are expected to provide market
available  elsewhere,  after  taking account  of these  access  under the na.donal  treatment  principle  and
risks.  a minimum  degree  of convergence  in regulations
and  supervision.  General issues involved in
The types of policy changes  investors may  integration of financial F rvices are discussed
fear are many and diverse.  For one, Mexico  below. As background  information  Appendix  A
may increase its corporate or withholding  taxes  contains - discussion  of how financial services
in  the future, to  try  to  earn more from the  wer6 6reated  under the GAIT negotiations,  the
investment that has  taken place  in  Mexico.  EC single market approach and the US-Canada
More simply, it could again nationalize some  FTA.
firms, providing only partial compensation,  or
again default on interest payments to  foreign  The liberalization of  trade  in financial
creditors.  Domestic investors would also fear  services  covers  two  areas:  cross-border
higher personal  taxes in the future on assets  they  transactions  and DFI.  Cross-border  transactions
make  visible to  th-e tax  authorities through  occur  when  the  customer  and  supplier of
investing them in Mexico.  Foreign investors  secvices reside in'different countries.  Cross-
could  also  fear  fiscal,  trade,  financial and  border transactIons  may be restricted  by controls
monetary  policy  changes  leading  to  a  on foreign travel or by controls that prohibit
depreciation of the exchange  rate.  Other types  residents from purchasing financial services in
of policy risks could include restrictions on the  overseas  markets.
repatriation  of profits, requirements  that profits
be  exchanged into dollars at  an  unfavorable  Controls on cross-border  transactions  are
exchange  rate, etc.  often justified on balance-of-payments  grounds
and aim to limit capital  flight.  Many countries,
Mexico's inability  to credibly commit  itself  however, support cross-border  transactions  that
to its present  policy  reduces  capital  investment  in  result in capital inflows, such as borrowing in
Mexico without reducing the ex  ante rate of  overseas markets  by large corporations. Cross-
return earned by  rational investors, whether  border transactions mav also be  restricted to
foreign or domestic. As a result, it lowers the  protect local financial  institutions.
country's  growth rate  and  wage rate.  Any
credible  commitment not  to  change policy  The liberalization  of controls on foreign
adversely  would be a welfare gain for Mexico.  travel  and  capital  movements  that  has
characterized the  economic policies of  most
Since firms and individuals  decide on the  developed and  many developing countries in
location of their investments  based not only on  recent years  has  reduced the  importance of
current  government  policies  but  also  on  cross-border transactions in trade negotiations.
expectations  of future policies, it is important  to  However, many countries  that continue  to apply
reassure investors concerning the stability of  controls  on  cross-border  transactions  are
these policies.  NAFTA offers the best possible  concerned that relinquishing control of foreign
opportunity to  assure  investors on  Mexico's  excl^.,e  and capital flows may have serious
commitment  to stay on the course of the sound  implications  for their balance of payments and
policies already implemented.  may undermine their  control over  monetary
policy. There is also concern  that freeing  cross-
Financial  Services. The third component  border transactions  may encourage  tax evasion.
of financial integration is the liberalization  of
financial services involving  banks and securities  DFI  involves the  presence of  foreign
firms, stock exchanges  and insurance  companies.  institutions  in the domestic  market. This may be
For these three sectors the FTA should envisage  affected  by  restrictions  on  the  right  of
7establishment  and  scope  of operations  of foreign  mitigated  fears about the possible abuse of
firms. Restrictions  on DFI  are more  likely  to be  monopoly  power  by foreign  suppliers  of public
motivated  by  strategic  and  protectionist  utility  services.
considerations  than  by  concerns about the
balance  of payments.  The pice of financial  integration  under
NAFTA depends on  the  existing level of
Much  of the recent  debate  regarding  the  integration  already  present  among  the member
liberalization  of trade  in services  has been  about  countries,  and Mexieo's pace of progress in
the  rules of  DFI  rather than cross-border  developing  prudential  regulations  and
transactions.  Financial  services,  strengthening  its supervisory  process. There is
telecommunications  and utilities  are the main  a great  deal of financial  integration  between  the
service  seetors  where  DFI has been  discouraged  US and Canada. In contrast,  Mexican  banks
for strategic  and protectionist  purposes. These  have  some  small  activities  in the US  a-ad  none  in
sectors  have  traditionally  been  seen  as occupying  Canada,  while  TJS  and Canadian  banks  have  not
a central  position  in the national  infrastructure  been able to provide  a full range of banking
for promoting  economic  development  and they  services  in Mexico  since 1982. They are just
have been reserved  nut only for national  but  now entering  the  insurance  industry  through
often  also for public  ownership  and control.'  acquisitions  oc minority interest in  existing
firms.  However, cross  border  financial
In recent  years, the emphasis  on public  transactions  between  Mexico  and the US are
ownership  and  control  of utilities  has given  way  thought  to be important. While progrw.s  in
in  many countries  to  an acceptance  of  the  regulations  may encourage  a  quick financial
benefits  not only of private  but also of foreign  integration, the  differences in  stages  of
ownership. This has been facilitated  by the  development,  implementation  of  supervisory
strengthening  of the administrative  powers  and  standards  and deposit  insurance  schemes  may
effectiveness  of regulatory  agencies,  which  has  provide  some justificaticn  for a slower pace
under a NAFTA than under the US-Canada
FTA.
8III.  SUBSECTOR ISSUES: COMMERCIAL BANKING
Regulatory Considerations  banking system,  and  with  improvements in
prudential  regulation  and supervision.
With  the  implementation of  NAFTA,
differences  in  regulatory  systems  between  The  financial  systems  of  all  three
Mexico, the United States  and Canada will gain  countries are thus in a process of fundamental
;  'portance.  There are fundamental  structural  structural change.  There  appears to  be  a
changes underway in all countries.  Canadians  common trend in the development  of all three
are the most advanced in their reform process  financial  systems  towards  regulatory reform  that
towards  achieving universal banking.  The  aims to  extend the powers and  activities of
government  reform  proposal,  which  was  various  institutions  and  allow  common
ar'  -niced  in  September  1990  (enacted  ownership  of firms within the financial sector.
December  1991 and  became effective June  This trend towards universal banking is also
1992), has three main goals:  to  expand the  coupled  with  an  increased  emphasis  on
powers and functions  of financial  institutions;  to  improving  prudential  regulation  and supervision.
establish new rules governing ownership and  Still, each country is moving along this path at
capitalization; and  to  strengthen  regulatory  its own pace.  For Mexico it is important to
controls and prudential safeguards 8. In  1990  keep abreast of these developments  in order not
the  United States also  considered a  reform  to  adopt or  continue regulations that  might
package  which  aimed  to  abolish branching  impede  tne  competitiveness  of  Mexican
restrictions and the separation between  banking  institutions.
and commerce, reform the deposit insurance
system, strengthen  the supervisory  system, and  The following discussion groups issues
reduce regulatory and supervisory  duplicatic  ? 9. that merit attention in evaluating the Mexican
However, the  reform bill failed to  pass the  banking regulations under four  headings: (i)
Congress.  market structure and barriers to entry and exit,
(ii) FONAPRE  and the banks savings  protection
The  Mexican banking system has  also  fund,  (iii) other  regulatory issues, and  (iv)
been going  through major restructuring and  supervision.
reform. Following  successive  regulatory  reform
in October 1988 and April 1989, the banking  Market  Structure and Barriers  to Entry and Exit
system  has  been  freed  from  the  restrictive
controls  that  inhibited  competition.  A  Maximizing  the benefits of foreign entry
privatization plan  for  commercial banks was  requires the deregulation  of domestic financial
announced  in May 1990, proceeded  quickly,  and  .nstitutions  and  the  establishment  of  a
was successfully  completed  by July 199210.  In  competitive environment.  If impediments  to
August 1990,  the banking  law was also amended  competition  exist in the domestic  economy, it is
to  relax  restrictions  on  bank  ownership.  likely  that  foreign financial institutions will
Restrictions  on financial  conglomerates  have  also  simply  capture  monopoly rents  rather  than
been relaxed and  the  formation of  financial  promote  competition  and efficiency. The  greater
groups that  might  include banks,  insurance  the extent of liberalization  of the markets, the
companies,  securities  brokers,  leasing  and  greater  will  be  the  benefits  of  foreign
factoring companies, etc. has been permitted.  participation.
Mexico has  also been simultaneously  dealing
with  the  restructuring  of  the  development  Although most of  the  impediments to
competition, such  as  interest  rate  ceilings,
9directed credit controls, and other constraints,  In  the  US  and  Canada,  obtaining a
have  been  removed  with  the  recent  banking  charter requires  lower initial capital  and
deregulations,  there are still barriers  to entry and  is relatively straightforward.  For example, in
exit  in  the  Mexican banking system.  The  the  United States charters and  initial capital
Mexican  banking  system is a highly  concentrated  requirements of national and  state banks are
one.  Out of the  18 domestic banks, the six  handled  by the Office of the Comptroller  of the
largest account for around 75% of the assets of  Currency  (OCC)  and  the  state  banking
the  entire  banking  sector.  However,  authorities,  respectively.  The OCC's regulations
concentration  in itself  does not necessarily  imply  stipulate  that the initial capital  of a national  bank
inefficiency.  For  example,  the  Canadian  must be in excess of US$1 million.  Although
banking system is also a  highly concentrated  there is variation among states, the New York
one,  dominated  by  six  large  banks."  Banking  Board sets the minimum  initial capital
Nevertheless,  studies of Canadian  banking  have  of  state-chartered banks  at  US$1.2 million.
found it to be highly competitive. 12 Only banks in large metropolitan  centers, such
as  New  York City,  Los  Angeles, and  San
One key factor in being able to foster  Francisco may be required to have an initial
competition within  a  concentrated banking  capital of US$5 million." 3 The application  for
environment is  market structure.  Levels of  a  charter  becomes the  part  of  a  publicly
competition  approaching  perfect competition  are  available  file,  and  generally  within
possible in contestable  markets where entry and  approximately  four to six months  a new national
exit to the market is costless. By eliminating  or  bank  can  commence operations  in  a  key
minimizing barriers to  entry and  exit bank  commercial  state.
regulators  can  induce  competition  among
existing banks since market discipline will be  In Canada, initial  capital  requirements  are
imposed by  not  only  the  number of  actual  higher, yet rules for obtaining  a banking  charter
competitors,  but also by potential competitors.  are less cumbersome. The capital requirement
which was Can$5 million (US$4.3 million) has
Leaving the issue of foreign bank entry  recently been  increased to  Can$10  million
aside, the Mexican  Banking  Law does not seem  (US$8.7 million).  However, given that  the
to encourage  the chartering  of new banks.  To  volume  of financial  operations  is much  higher in
charter  a  new  bank  the  minimum capital  the United States and Canada than in Mexico,
requirement is determined  by 0.5% of the paid  the Mexican initial capital requirement  appears
capital  and reserves of the whole banking  system  to be unduly restrictive.
at the 31st day of December of the preceding
year.  An estimate  of this requirement  is around  Another issue that is  related to  entry
US$20 million  based on 1990  year-end  capital  of  restrictions regards the limits imposed on the
the banking  systnim,  obtained  from the Banco de  participation  of foieign banks.  Until recently,
Mexico. Conditioning  initial  entry requirements  Mexico  did not allow  foreign banks to establish
on  the  total  capital of  the  banking system  branches  or  subsidiaries.  Following  the
increases entry barriers as  the value of  the  privatization  of banks, foreign banks (and other
banking system increases.  Therefore, as the  investors)  are allowed  to hold up to a cumulative
Mexican  banking  system continues  to capitalize,  30% of the capital of a commercial  bank (or of
new banks will face stricter barriers to entry.  a  financial holding company).  Individual
Furthermore, issuance  of bank charters is at the  holdings of either Mexican  or foreign investors
discretion of the Federal Government  and there  cannot exceed 5%,  although the  Ministry of
are no clear rules or procedures.  Finance may authorize  a greater percentage up
to a maximum of 10%.14 This rule does not
apply to the Federal Government, institutional
10investors (whose individual participation may  As  discussed  above,  for  developing
amount  to as much as 15%), the Bank Savings  countries  allowing  foreign bank entry has trade-
Protection  Fund  and  financial  holding  offs between maximizing  benefits from foreign
companies.  However, it is debatable whether  entry  and  retaining  control  of  domestic
this 10% rule can be enforced  effectively  given  institutions.  Foreign  ownership of  banking
the complex relationships among international  institutions  is a politically  sensitive topic.  The
institutions. In addition,  foreign  tax credit in the  role of banks in implementing  monetary policy
US is only allowed to entities having at least  and financing government out  of  seigniorage
10% ownership  control (see Section  6).  makes the banking industry a  very important
policy  instrument whose  control  cannot  be
The  United States do  not  have  such  relinquished.
restrictions; foreign banks can own state or
national  banks  or  operate  wholly-owned  For  Mexico,  the  30%  ownership
branches  and subsidiaries. But the acquisition  of  restriction  in  already  existing  institutions,
management  control in insured banks, which is  coupled  with future free entry of wholly-owned
deemed to occur if  more than 25% of bank  subsidiaries, may  be  adequate to  retaining
capital (or in the case of individual  shareholders  control, while reaping the benefits of foreign
more than 10% of bank capital) is subject to  participation.  To ensure that Mexicans retain
approval  by  the  regulatory  authorities" 5. control of  large intermediaries, the Canadian
Moreover,  differences  in  regulations  for  system of  Schedule I  and  II  banks can  be
different states are cumbersome  and banks are  adopted. Schedule  I banks would  be the existing
subject to interstate  branching  restrictions.  large Mexican banks that are widely-held  and
Mexican-controlled, with  maximum  single
In  Canada,  banks  have  a  variety  of  ownership of  10%.  Subsidiaries of  foreign
ownership structures; chartered banks can be  banks  and  new  domestic  banks  could  be
widely-held, or  closely-held fer  a  temporary  established as closely-held  Schedule II banks,
period.  Schedule I banks, which include the  and  if  their  capital increases over  a  certain
largest six Canadian  banks, have to be widely-  threshold, they would  be required to go public.
held with no one person or group owning more
than 10%  of their shares. Schedule  II banks can  Opening  up a domestic  market to foreign
be started and owned on a closely-held  basis for  competition  can  also  be  accomplished by
the first 10 years, or directly-owned  by widely-  permitting  the cross-border  provision  of banking
held regulated financial institutions  that are not  services.  This  requires  the  protection  of
banks. Foreign banks can establish  subsidiaries  nonresident depositors by extending insurance
in  Canada, designated as Schedule II  banks,  coverage  of deposits  to nonresidents  (see  below),
subject to  restrictions on market share, asset  as well as closer cooperation  and coordination  of
growth, transfer of loans to their parent banks,  information sharing  across  the  borders  to
branch  approval,  and  capital  expansion.  minimize  possible fraudulent activities.
Schedule  II  banks  whose  capital  exceeds
Can$750 million are required to have at least  Branching  restrictions are another way of
35% of the total voting  rights attached  to shares  restricting  entry  that  lead  to  market
that are widely-held. After the US-Canada  Free  segmentation. In Mexico  branching  is no longer
Trade  Agreement, US  banks are  no  longer  subject to  specific aathorization.  Banks are
subject to  foreign bank  restrictions and  are  required to  submit an  annual plan  of  their
treated as Canadian  banks, except  that Canadian  branching policy to  the  authorities but  are
branches  of  US  banks  are  considered  otherwise  free to open and close branches. But
independent  Schedule  II banks."6  banks should also have the right to buy and sell
branches to each other as this would facilitate
11their expansion in  areas where they may be  With  the  privatization of  the  banking
underrepresented or  where business is  more  system,  a  Banking Savings Protection Fund
profitable. This would allow banks to mobilize  (BSPF)  is envisaged  to take over the functions  of
funds from the cheapest  sources.  the FONAPRE. The purpose of this fund will
be to provide preventive  support for banks that
Canada  does  not  have  branching  are likely to encounter financial problems. For
restrictions.  In the US, the ban on interstate  a newly-privatized  and relatively inexperienced
branching (McFadden Act, 1927) and the curb  banking  system,  having  a  vaguely-defined
on affiliation between banks in different states  insurance  fund may create more problems than
[Section  3(d) of the Bank Holding Company  Act  it  can  solve.  Timely  exit  of  insolvent
of  1956]  are  still  in  force,  although  the  institutions  is  important  to  foster  healthy
constraints  on the geographic  expansion  of banks  competition.  Preventing individual institution
and bank holding companies  are being steadily  insolvencies  may destabilize  the financial  system
eased by reciprocity agreements  between  states.  by  distorting  risk-taking  incentives  and
Unless  US restrictions  of interstate  branching  are  undermining  market  discipline."  The
amended, at some stage Mexico may have to  experience  of the US savings and loan industry
enter into the same kind of arrangements  with  exemplifies  the importance of allowing timely
every state.  exit.  The BSPF should have very well-defined
powers and  its purpose should be  to  protect
Exit in the Mexican banking system is  small,  unsophisticated  (resident  and  non-
equally  difficult.  Banks  with  financial  resident)  investors  rather  than  mismanaged
difficulties are  financed and  restructured by  institutions. Such a deposit insurance scheme,
FONAPRE,  the  Mexican  insurance  fund.  coupled with strong and effective supervision
Deposit insurance  is another issue that deserves  can establish  public trust in the newly-privatized
special  attention  for  the  newly-privatized  banking system and  allow Mexican banks to
Mexican  banking  system  and the implementation  compete  with foreign banks on equal ground.
of  NAFTA.  If  properly  designed  and
implemented, and coupled with effective risk  In the United States, the Federal Deposit
management  and  supervision,  a  deposit  Insurance  Corporation  (FDIC)  was established  in
insurance  system  can  also  enhance  the  1933,  after  the  massive bank  failures  that
competitive ability  of  Mexican  banks  with  occurred during the Great Depression of 1930-
respect to foreign banks.  33.  The original role of deposit insurance was
to  protect  the  nation's  payment  and  credit
FONAPRE and the  Bank Savings Protection  systems from  system-wide disruption and to
Fund  shelter  small  deposit  holders  from  los, -s.
Through  time,  the  FDIC's  preference  for
Mexican banks  that  have  liquidity or  keeping insolvent banks  afloat  and  handling
solvency  problems  are  financed  by  the  inescapable  failures through mergers or assisted
FONAPRE.  Banks pay  fixed premiums to  transactions  has taken the US deposit insurance
FONAPRE.  Those  receiving support  are  to a system of de facto 100% coverage.
regulated  more  closely  till  they  reachieve
financial stability.  Before the  privatization,  By providing insurance  coverage to most
since the banks were also publicly owned, moral  bank depositors, FDIC destroyed an important
hazard problems were minimal and insolvent  external  discipline  on bank risk-taking. Without
banks could be pressured to curb their unsound  insurance,  large  depositors  have  strong
management  practices.  incentives  to monitor the financial condition  of
their banks. The possibility  that depositors  may
withdraw  their funds gives banks an incentive  to
12avoid excessive concentrations in  risky  and  without such formal requirements.  Banks are
iHliquid  assets  and  to  stay  well  capitalized.  required to maintain  minuscule  reserves that on
Without such market discipline  it is difficult  for  average should not be less than 0.5% of eligible
regulators to  ensure safe  and sound banking  liabilities. Solvent  banks, when allowed to pay
practices.  The US needs a deposit insurance  market rates on their liabilities, are expected  to
reform that would reinstate market discipline.  handle  liquidity  requirements  in  normal
The reform should include improved  accounting  circumstances. During crises, the central bank
and insolvency-resolution  procedures,  risk-rated  is trusted to handle runs on the banking  system.
insurance premiums, decreased coverage, and
expanded  powers  for  deposit-insurance  Reserve  requirements  in  US  were
regulators that would increase transparency  and  simplified  by  the  Depository  Institutions
allow  sophisticated  investors  to  play  an  Deregulation  and Monetary  Control  Act of 1980.
important role  in  disciplining banks.  To  a  They now vary from zero to  12% of deposits
certain  extent  some  of  these  issues  were  based on  the type and  size of  the  account.
addressed by  the  Federal Deposit Insurance  Reserves do not earn interest.  Canada also has
Improvement  Act of 1991 (FDICIA).  cash reserve requirements  that vary from one to
10% based on the type and size of the account.
The  Canadian  Deposit  Insurance  Canadian banks also have a secondary reserve
Corporation (CDIC) was established only  in  requirement of  4%.  In  Canada there  is  a
1967 in response to the failure of several trust  proposal to phase out the cash reserves within
companies, again to  protect small depositors.  two years.
However, the decision  of the banking  authorities
to protect uninsured depositors in 11 of the 18  With  the  April  1989  deregulation,
loan and trust companies, and all three of the  Mexican reserve requirements  were eliminated.
banks that failed during the 1980s, sparked a  Instead, banks were required to  hold 30% of
debate  about  whether  the government  has created  their deposits in qualified  tradable paper.  Only
incentives for  depository institutions to  take  CETES (Mexican treasury bill) was eligible.
excessive risks.  For a number of years, the  This liquidity  requirement  allowed  banks to earn
banking industry has  been  advocating some  market  interest  rates  and  was justified  on
minimal level  of  market  discipline through  prudential  grounds. However, this requirement
deposit  coj-insurance  by individual  depositors  on  imposed a tax on banks since more profitable
deposits exceeding a certain limit.  No major  uses  were  available  for  these  funds.
changes  in bank failure resolution  procedures  are  Furthermore,  having  only one government  paper
currently under consideration  in Canada.  as qualified tradable paper was an unjustified
restriction.
Other Regulatory  Issues
Generally, continuing  liquidity problems
The following  specific  points also deserve  are  considered to  be  an  indication of  the
consideration in  eliminating impediments to  institution's  underlying insolvency which  is
competition.  better  controlled  by  capital  requirements.
Elimination  of liquidity requirements  would be
Liquidity  requirements. Both in US and  feasible if  institutions are  sound  and  well-
Canada reserve requirements are seen as  an  capitalized  and a strong bank supervisory  system
instrument  of monetary  policy. However, it has  is in place.  In the case of Mexico, liquidity
been shown  that  the  imposition of  formal,  requirements were justified  as  a  transitional
legally enforced reserve requirements is  not  regulation.  In  fact,  as  steps were taken to
essential for monetary control."  In fact, the  improve bank capitalization  and supervision, in
Bank of England executes its monetary control  mid-1991 liquidity requirements on additional
13deposits were eliminated, and a phase-out  plan  it is difficult to evaluate the effectiveness  and
for the already existing limits was put in place.  accuracy  of on-site  inspections  which are crucial
in bank supervision.
Capital  requirements.  The  Mexican
Banking Law  requires banks to  have  a  net  Both  US  and  Canada  have  well-
capital of at least 6% of their assets, contingent  established supervisory systems.  In  the US
liabilities, and  any other operations that are  sound  banks with assets of US$300 million  and
subject to significant risks, taking into account  above are  examined annually.  Supervision
the  international capital adequacy standards.  responsibilities  are shared among national and
The  US  and  Canadian banks are subject to  state authorities. Canadians  also conduct  annual
international  risk-adjusted  capital  adequacy  rules  inspections.  The Superintendent  of Financial
which state total capital must be 8% of risk-  Institutions  is the main supervisory  authority. In
adjusted assets.  Of the total capital, at least  both countries on-site and off-site methods are
50%  must  represent  core  capital  (common  used in order to obtain information about the
equity) and the remainder  can be supplementary  economic  condition  of the institutions. Off-site
capital  (preferred  shares  and  debentures).  monitoring  consi. s  of  analyzing  quarterly
Mexican  banks  are  expected to  reach  the  income and balance sheet statements  filed with
international  standards  of capitalization  to ensure  the authorities.  To  a  limited extent off-site
Lhat they  have  adequate equity cushion for  monitoring  also makes use of market data (such
competition.  as growth rates, deposit  rates, and stock prices),
public disclosures,  and credit ratings  assigned  by
Supervision  of the Banking  System  private analysts. On-site  examinations  consist  of
a team of inspectors  that visit the head office of
Deregulation of  the  financial  system  the bank.  Examiners  rate the bank based on the
without  adequate prudential  regulation  and  detailed CAMEL criteria.  The criteria used by
supervision  is dangerous. This is especially  true  both countries  consist  of Capital  adequacy,  Asset
if the institutions  are not well-capitalized,  or if  quality,  Management quality,  Earnings, and
they are  newly-privatized as  in  the  case of  Liquidity.  The team of examiners carries on
Mexico. Moreover, since  the privatization  price  discussions  with  senior  management  and
for some Mexican banks was much higher than  prepares a formal report pointing out strengths
their book value of capital, these banks will be  and weaknesses  in the bank's operation.
under  additional  pressure  to  recoup  their
expenses before the negotiations  are completed  Given the importance  of supervision for
and  their  protection is  phased out.  Thus,  a newly-privatized  banking system operating in
improving bank  supervision is  as  crucial as  a  deregulated  environment, Mexican  bank-
deregulation  of the banking industry.  supervision reform should receive the attention
it deserves. A good supervisory  system requires
Mexican banks are  supervised by  the  a well-defined  supervisory  framework,  adequate
Comision  Nacional  Bancaria  (CNB).  resources and technology  for the supervisors  to
Supervision  is  performed  through  off-site  obtain and  monitor information in  a  timely
monitoring  of bank performance  and visits to the  fashion, and sufficient authority for supervisors
banks to review their financial condition. The  to enforce their decisions.
supervisory  system  is  currently  being
computerized.  Efforts  are  being  made  to  The Mexican supervisory system should
improve the  loan  classification system and  be  evaluated within the context of  Mexico's
monitoring of the bank portfolios.  Although  banking  environment. The banking  environment
after these developments,  the Mexican off-site  has been changing  from a controlled  and highly
monitoring facilities will be quite sophisticated,  regulated  market to one with many free market
14characteristics.  The private sector has started  requirements need to be reexamined, Mexican
gaining  an  increasingly greater  access  to  capital  adequacy  requirements  are expected  to be
commercial bank  credit  and  services.  The  in line with international standards within the
privatization  of  the  banks  also  presents  next few years.
additional  challenges  to  both  banks  and
supervisors.  Loan concentration should be monitored
carefully and  rollover practices and  interest
With increased competition and private  accrual policies should be judged based on the
banking,  institutions will  make an  effort to  repayment  capacity  of the borrowers.  Mexican
maximize their profits.  One outcome of this  bank supervisors  may have  to be especially  strict
process will be  the need to  reduce operating  about placing controls on the capitalization  of
costs and increase efficiency. However, banks  delinquent  and unpaid interest.
may also be  inclined to  increase their credit,
interest, and liquidity risks.  Credit risk will  In addition, improving disclosure rules,
inevitably increase  as  banks  increase their  using  internationally comparable accounting
lending  activities  to the private sector, especially  techniques would  increase  transparency and
into new and profitable areas with which they  make  supervision easier  not  only  for  the
are  unfamiliar.  As  banks  compete  for  regulators but  also  for  the  general  public.
customers,  decreasing  margins  will make higher  Encouraging development of  private  rating
risk borrowers attractive.  Banks may also be  agencies  would  also  improve  information
subject  to interest  rate risk, given the liberalized  dissemination  and  help  establish  market
interest rates, and the possibility  of mismatching  discipline.  Audits  of  bank  statements by
the durations  of assets and liabilities. Liquidity  independent  auditors  may be required  to provide
risk would also increase as increases in default  independent  checks.
risk and duration gaps would hamper the bank's
ability  to  meet  its  maturing  obligations.  To be able to obtain timely information
Therefore, for  Mexican regulators it will be  on the banks, supervisors  should have adequate
quite a  challenge to  maintain the safety and  resources.  They should be able to hire, train,
soundness  of the banking  system without  placing  and retain a sufficient  number of employees, as
an  unnecessary  regulatory  burden  on  the  well as  acquire appropriate technology.  For
industry.  example,  CNB  has already computerized  its off-
site  monitoring.  Statistical  early-detection
A  well-defined supervisory framework  models can be utilized to improve monitoring
requires  many  components. Loan classirication  and make maximum  use of this computerized
and provisioning rules based on risk of default  data base.  Frequency  of on-site inspections  can
are important in monitoring asset quality and  be increased  or priority can be determined  based
early detection of deteriorating bank portfolios.  on such models.
As  mentioned above, CNB is already in the
process of improving its loan classification  and  Supervisors  should also be able to have
provisioning  rules.  sufficient authority to  deal with  mismanaged
institutions. They should be able to discontinue
Capital adequacy rules should be based  insurance coverage,  issue  cease  and  desist
on the riskiness of bank operations and should  orders,  force  write-offs or  provisions,  and
grow  paraiiei  to  the  expansion  of  these  demand capital increases.
operations.  Initial capital requirements  should
be low enough to allow entry to the system but  Even  if  supervisory  regulations  are
at the same time adequate  to enable  safe start-up  adequate,  and the above  conditions  are met, lack
of  operations.  Although  initial  capital  of  an  appropriate  incentive  structure  may
15prevent  financial institution regulators from  expenditures and failures must be  eliminated.
doing their job properly  and may  thus jeopardize  This  may  be  achieved  through  greater
enforcement." Therefore, it is also important  transparency. In addition,  independent  hearings
to  protect  supervisors  from  political  and  held by budget  committees  can be used to assess
bureaucratic  pressures. For example,  in the US  the adequacy  of regulators' compliance  with the
deposit-institution  regulators  face pressures  from  procedures.
politicians,  their  regulatory  clientele,  and
lobbyists. As appointed  officials, regulators  face  For Mexico, it is important  to learn from
pressure  from  politicians to  leave  problems  international  experience  in  structuring  its
unsolved  since  tackling  them openly  would  cause  supervisory system.  Bank  regulators  and
conflict  with  various  constituencies  and  supervisors  should have  the necessary  incentives
adversely  affect  the  chances of  winning  a  to  avoid conflicts of interest.  This  is again
reelection. Following  a cover-up  strategy  keeps  possible through very well-defined  supervisory
involved  constituencies and  political  action  rules, transparency, necessary mandate for the
committees  willing to pay tribute to politicians.  regulators to perform their duties, and periodic
Regulators also  face oversight controls from  independent  checks on regulatory activities.
their  regulatory clientele, that  is,  from  the
institutions they regulate.  If  regulators can  Operating Efficienc)
successfully  complete  their term in government
service, they can generally  expect higher wages  One  of  the  potential  benefits  from
in postgovernment  employment. Their success  NAFTA for the Mexican  financial sector is the
is determined  by the "perceived"  quality  of their  likely increase in  operating efficiency of  the
performance, which makes them very sensitive  Mexican banks.  After  a  long  consolidation
to the opinions of the institutions  they regulate,  process, the number  of banks has been reduced
as well as to those of the trade associations  and  in Mexico  from around 200 in 1975  to 18 state-
lobbying  groups  connected  with  these  owned banks and 2 private banks (Obrero and
institutions.  These career-oriented incentives  Citibank) by the mid-1980s.  Concentration  is
and political and bureaucratic constraints lead  quite high with 6 banks holding about 75% of
regulators  to  be  influenced  by  their  total assets. As already discussed,  concentration
constituencies,  avoiding  solutions  unfavorable  to  in itself is not necessarily a problem.  It is the
them,  or  promoting solutions that  they find  combination  of high concentration  with extensive
particularly  desirable.  state-ownership  and restrictive regulations that
usually result in high inefficiency  reflected in
One of the most challenging  features of  high staffing  levels and wide bank margins.
financial reform in  the US is  improving the
incentive  structures  for  regulators  and  Analyzing bank efficiency is a difficult
politicians. For regulators  this entails  additional  and complicated  process.  The main problem is
obligations imposed in the form of requiring  the lack of  a  satisfactory definition of  bank
improved  accounting practices  and  strictly  output.  Most  accounting ratios  that  relate
enforcing  capital  requirements  and  tough  revenue  and expense  items to total assets, gross
insolvency-resolution  procedures.  Additional  income and  equity suffer from the effects of
market checks and balances on the exercise of  differences  in capital  structure,  product mix, and
governmental  powers through private insurance  accounting conventions (with  regard  to  the
agencies are envisaged.  Greater powers for  treatment  of  inflation,  asset  valuation  and
regulators  are  also  deemed  necessary  for  amortization,  loan loss provisioning,  and hidden
successful  enforcement  of regulations. To better  reserves) among banks, across countries and
motivate politicians, the option of covering up  over times.
problems by  focusing on  only acknowledged
16Although  detailed  data for Mexican  banks  suffer  adjustment costs due  to  the  changes
that are comparable  to those of Canadian  and US  brought  by  privatization  and  increased
banks are not readily available, it is generally  competition.  The evaluation of the impact of
held that Mexican banks exhibit much higher  NAFTA  should  be based on "net" welfare  gains,
operating asset  and  equity ratios than their  also  taking  into  account  the  costs  of  the
counterparts  in their northern neighbors 2".  For  adjustment  process.
instance, in the United States and Canada, the
return  on  bank  assets averaged around  1  %  Clearly the most important issue to be
during the second half of the 1980s, while in  addressed  during the transition is how to handle
Mexico it  has  been  well over  2%.  Gross  the bad-loan  portfolio and unfunded bank labor
income  margins  were  less  than  3.75%  in  liabilities. Two extreme  transition paths can be
Canada, between 4.5% and 5% in the United  visualized. On the one hand, the transition  may
States, but well over 7% in Mexico. As around  take place quickly  with minimum  impact on the
70%-75% the  cost/income ratio  of  Mexican  financial institutions  and maximum  benefits for
banks was not particularly high by international  the users of financial  services. However on the
standards, but staffing levels at 40 employees  other hand, transition  can also be relatively  more
per  branch were significantly higher than the  difficult  and be very costly for the government.
average of  26 staff per branch prevailing in
Canada and the  United States.  This  partly  Although not likely, if many banks are
reflects the lower branch density in  Mexico,  expected to  emerge undercapitalized after the
where there are  about 50 bank branches per  privatization, the government may consider a
million people as against between 250 and 500  very  gradual transition period during  which
in the other  two countries. The return on equity  barriers to entry remain.2  In this way, newly-
of Mexican  banks is high in nominal  terms, but  privatized banks  and  their  foreign  minority
in view of the very high level of inflation  in the  shareholders  will be able to keep their margins
1980s  and  the  unsatisfactory  accounting  high, and slowly write-off  their bad loans, fund
treatment  of gains from the revaluation  of assets,  their labor liabilities  and recapitalize. Only after
it  is  very  difficult  to  compare  the  real  the financial  health of the banks are restored, an
profitability  of Mexican  banks with that of their  opening  up will be considered. However, there
northern counterparts.  are  two  serious drawbacks to  recapitalizing
through rent instead  of equity:
Despite the difficulty of  comparing the
operating efficiency  of Mexican  banks with that  A  Multisector Approach.  As  already
of  US  and  Canadian banks,  it  is  generally  discussed,  financial  services  provided  by
expected that  opening the  Mexican banking  financial institutions are basically intermediate
market to  greater  competition will  result in  goods.  Therefore,  protection of  financial
greater  efficiency.  This will be  reflected in  institutions  is similar to protecting industries  of
lower operating costs and lower margins that  intermediate goods.  Tn  protecting financial
will benefit all users of banking  services.  intermediaries,  gradual transition policies will
prevent  domestic  producers  from  accessing
The Transition Process  cheaper credit and an expanded  set of financial
services. Furthermore, if the real sector is at a
With  the  implementation of  NAFTA,  more advanced  stage of liberalization,  as in the
there will be  welfare gains for the users of  case  of Mexico,  protecting  the financial  sector  or
financial services due to increased competition  allowing its gradual transition, taxes the real
and availability of a wider range of financial  sector which faces international  competition in
instruments  at more favorable  terms. However,  pricing  its  output.  This  tax  is  also
at the same  time, commercial  banks may have  to  disproportionally  born by smaller producers as
17explained in Section 2.  In order to avoid this  greater disclosure  is very important  in enforcing
undesirable outcome, liberalization in the real  regulations and establishing market discipline.
and financial sectors should  be synchronized.  Further deregulations  are necessary to  remove
barriers to entry and exit. The deposit  insurance
The  Political  Economy  Arguments  system should have well-defined  purpose and
Against Gradualism.  Financial liberalization  powers.  Also discrepancies  between different
involves  transfers of wealth  and income  from the  financial  institution  regulations  should  be
financial institutions to  the users of financial  eliminated.
services.  An abrupt transition exaggerates  and
makes these transfers more visible.  Naturally,  Opening  up the Mexican  banking  sector to
adversely affected groups oppose the reform  new entry  is  likely to  reduce the value  of
process.  In the case of Mexico, since the large  existing  Mexican  banks.  To  the  extent
proportion of financial institutions were state-  privatization  prices paid included  a premium  for
owned,  these  problems  were  minimal,  remaining  entry barriers (the average price was
However,  if  the  government were  to  keep  three times the book value and  14 times the
barriers  to  entry  in  order  to  allow  slow  expected earnings), the institutions may have
recapitalization  of the newly-privatized  banks,  expected to  collect "protection" rents for  an
political economy  considerations  would start to  extended period of transition during which they
become important.  Gradualism  may allow  can recapitalize  through these rents.  This is not
extensive lobbying opportunities for the now  a  desirable solution since it  would impose a
private  banks,  which  in  turn  endanger  specific tax on the real sector and may weaken
continuation  of the reform.  This may explain  the commitment  of the government  to financial
why governments  that appear to be committed  to  reform  due  to  opposition from  the  newly
reforms have difficulty abolishing temporary  privatized  banks.
controls. If the issue of financial  liberalization
is not dealt with at the time of privatization,  Having  concluded  the  privatization,
efforts to abolish  entry restrictions would  surely  Mexico  still  needs  to  remove  remaining
face opposition. Clearly these concerns  favor a  uncertainties and  strengthen  its  supervisory
relatively faster liberalization  to gradualism.  systems.  Improving systems of  prudential
supervision  and regulation  are crucial given the
Conclusions and Recommendations  newly  privatized,  relatively  inexperienced
banking system. Ensuring transparency,
To maximize the efficiency gains from  and clarifying  rules for new domestic as well as
liberalization,  the regulatory  environment  of the  foreign  entry  and  exit  will  help  remove
banks  can  be  further  reformed  through  uncertainties about expected future rents.  In
deregulation  and  better  defining  and  addition, adoption of  the Canadian system of
implementing  prudential  supervision.  Schedule I and II banks would allow wholly-
Establishing  an effective supervisory  system is  owned foreign institutions without  jeopardizing
crucial  and  will  determine  the  pace  of  Mexican  control of large intermediaries.
liberalization. Improving  transparency  through
18IV.  SUBSECTOR ISSUES: INSURANCE
Regulatory Considerations  Market  Strmcture  and Barriers to Entry
Since the extensive deregula,ion of the  The Mexican insurance sector comprises
Mexican  insurance  industry  in  1990,  the  45 companies,  two of which are state-owned,  37
regulatory  differences between  US, Canada  and  are  private  primary  insurers,  4  are  mutual
Mexico  have been reduced substantially.  insurers and two  are private reinsurers.  No
branch or local subsidiary  of foreign companies
In  terms  of  financial  conglomerates,  is authorized to  operate in  Mexico, although
Mexico has  already  enacted legislation that  there are over 260 registered foreign reinsurers
permits  the  creation  of  financial  holding  that are authorized to reinsure Mexican risks.
companies  able  to  own  banks,  insurance  Mexican companies operate in  both  life and
companies  and securities firms (as well as other  nonlife  business  and  are  not  required  te
financial  companies specializing in  leasing,  segregate their capital accounts, although they
factoring, data processing, etc.).  maintain separate technical reserves.  Marke
concentration is  very  high,  with  80%  of
In  Canada, new legislation enacted in  premiums accounted for  by  the  klrgest  8
December 1991  has permitted  the desegregation  companies. The level of concentration  is much
of  banking and  insurance by  allowing the  higher than in  either Canada or  the  United
creation  of financial  groups  that own subsidiaries  States.
in both sectors.  Canadian  banks and insurance
companies have earlier been allowed to  own  Until the deregulation  of 1990, insurance
securities firms through holding companies.  companies  were authorized  to operate by means
of  concessions that  were  granted  by  the
In the United  States, insurance  companies  government. Insurance  business  was effectively
can be organized either as independent  entities  treated as a public service.  There were strict
or  as  controlled  subsidiaries  of  holding  limits on individual  shareholdings  (10% but up
companies.  Insurance holding companies are  to 15% with government  permission),  while no
not  subject  to  direct  insurance  regulatory  foreign insurer could sell insurance in Mexico
supervision  and  are  permitted  to  own  and  no  increase  in  foreign  ownership of
subsidiaries engaging in  virtually any  other  insurance companies was allowed.  However,
sector, except banking.  However, the United  several  grandfathered firms  had  a  higher
States continue to  impose a  legal  separation  concentration  of  domestic  and  foreign
between commercial and investment banking,  ownership.
between banking and insurance, and between
banking and commerce.  Following  the  extensive  financial
deregulation  of the past two years or so, the new
The  discussion of  issues on  Mexican  authorization system  treats  insurance  as  a
insurance regulations is organized under four  commercial  activity.  100% ownership through
headings: (i) market structure and barriers to  a financial holding company is allowed, while
entry, (ii) insurance guarantee funds (iii) other  foreign participation  is permitted up to 30%.2
regulatory  issues,  and  (iv)  supervision  of  However,  individual  shareholdings  in
insurance.  independent  insurance  companies  are still limited
to  15%.  The  state  continues  to  have
discrctionary  powers  in  authorizing  new
19companies and  no  new  licenses have  been  In Canada, insurance companies can be
issued. But most insurance  companies  now have  authorized  at either the federal or the provincial
49% participation from large foreign insurers  level.  The minimum caspital  requirements  for
that include such companies  as AIG and Cigna  federally-licensed insurance  companies  are
from the United States, Allianz from Germany,  Can$1.5  million for  nonlife companies and
Mafpre and Banco Santander from Spain, and  Can$2  million for life insurers  (between  US$1.2
Generali and RAS  (the Italian subsidiary of  and 1.6 million). Federally-licensed  companies
Allianz) from Italy.  In  some cases, foreign  must also be  authorized by  the provinces in
companies  are reported  to have effective  control  which they operate. There is a large number  of
through friendly shareholdings  from individual  foreign companies that are authorized at the
investors.  federal level.
In contrast  to banking  where  the minimum  The Canadian  insurance  market  comprises
capital requirement  is set in relation to the total  over 500 companies,  of which 14 are composite
capital of the sector, in insurance  the minimum  insurers, 175 are life insurers and over 250 are
capital  requirements  have been set by regulation  nonlife insurers.  Foreign presence is  very
at a  fixed level.  This  reflects the need for  extensive  - over 80% of all companies  are either
healthy competition  and balanced  growth of the  local  branches  and  agencies  of  foreign
sector but does not directly depend on the total  companies  or foreign  controlled  local companies.
capital of the industry (capital  requirements  can  Foreign  companies  account  for  32%  of
be changed  by future regulations). The current  premiums in life and 61% in nonlife insurance
requirements specify a  minimum of  Mex$2  (1988).  These are the highest among OECD
billion  for life insurance  and Mex$1.5  billion  for  countries  for  which  data  are  reported. 2'
one line of general business, rising to Mex$2  Foreign companies  also generally have a much
billion for two lines and Mex$2.5 billion for  higher share of reinsurance  business.
three lines or more.  These limits (which range
from US$0.5 million  to less than US$1 million)  In the United  States, insurance  companies
are  considered to  be  quite  reasonable  and  are authorized  only at the state level.  There are
unlikely to act as a barrier to entry.  no  federal  or  national companies.  As  in
banking, home state authorization is  not  yet
Although  the  minimum  capital  accepted  but,  unlike  banking,  interstate
requirements  are  quite  reasonable,  the  expansion  of operations  has long been permitted.
discretionary  powers  that the authorities  continue  Companies  from  other  states  (which  are
to enjoy  may act as a barrier to entry if they are  described  as "foreign"  in most state regulations)
not  applied  objectively.  Ideally,  the  and companies  from other countries (which are
authorization  process should allow all insurers  described  as "alien") are allowed  to expand  their
that are deemed "fit and proper" and can show  operations  in  particular  states  through  the
proof  of  solvency  to  enter  the  market.  establishment  of local subsidiaries or  through
Moreover, a procedure  for appealing  denials  and  branches.  Local  subsidiaries must meet the
revocations  of license should  also be established.  minimum  capital  requirements  of  state
The threat of potential competition from new  companies, while branches are also generally
entry is a necessary ingredient  of a contestable  required to place deposits that are secured by
market.  Developing  countries may have some  trust  agreements and  are  equivalent to  the
reservations about granting automatic market  minimum  capital  requirements  imposed  on local
access to foreign insurers but such reservations  subsidiaries.  Several  states  do  not  allow
do not apply  to the case of more liberal  domestic  companies owned  or  controlled by  foreign
entry.  governments to  establish operations in  their
states. Such prohibitions  reflect concerns  about
20unfairly  subsidized competition, location of  criteria to ensuring the fulfillment of  'fit  and
assets, quality of regulation and management,  proper" and "adequacy solvency"  criteria.  To
and uncertainty of contract enforcement  in the  ensure  more  liberal entry  a  procedure  for
case of diplomatic  disputes.  appealing denials and  revocations of  license
should also be established.
Minimum  capital  requirements  vary
across states but in general they range between  Insurance  Guarantee  Funds
US$0.5 and US$2 million.  Both out-o-state
firms and firms from other countries  that wish  to  As in banking,  guarantee  or compensation
operate nationwide have to incur the additional  funds raise many issues.  They are created in
administrative  costs of dealing with over 50 sets  order  to  protect  small  policyholders from
of criteria, while  some states also impose  special  insurance company insolvencies  but they give
requirements  that discriminate  against "foreign"  rise to prnblems  of moral hazard. Policyholders
and  "alien" firms,  such as  higher minimum  have no incentive to  choose sound companies
capital requirements,  higher premium  taxes, US  and  may  prefer companies offering cheaper
citizenship  or state residency  for board directors  policies  or  promising  higher  returns  and
or managers, local maintenance  of records, and  disregard  the higher risks that may be involved.
frequent periodic renewal of  licenses.  For  Guarantee funds also provide strong incentives
instance,  in New York, alien insurers  must make  to directors and owners of companies that are
a deposit of 150% of the amount required from  near insolvency  to invest in highly risky assets
domestic insurers,  while  in  Texas premium  and  effectively  "bet"  their  companies.
taxes, which are levied on gross premiums, are  Regulatory  authorities  must  develop  their
higher for  companies that maintain less than  supervisory  capabilities  and must be empowered
90% of their investments  in Texas.  to take timely  action to prevent weak institutions
from magnifying  potential  losses.
The  US  insurance industry comprises
about 3,800 property and casualty companies  Guarantee  funds  are of greater importance
and 2,300 life and health insurance.  Most of  in systems  that comprise large numbers of small
these  companies  are  small  and  market  institutions.  In  the United States, there are
concentration is not much different from that  separate guarantee funds in most states for life
prevailing in  Canada or  European countries,  and nonlife companies.  These are funded by
although it  is  much less  than Japan.'  A  assessments  on covered companies that depend
relatively small  number  (less  than  200)  of  on the required payouts. However, assessments
generally  larger companies  are "alien", i.e. they  are subject to limits and although losses from
are owned or controlled by foreign residents.  insolvencies of insurance companies have not
"Alien"  companies  account for about 5% of life  been large, there have been cases when state
premiums, 10% of nonlife premiums and 33%  guarantee  funds have come  very close  to running
of reinsurance  premiums  (US Treasury, 1990).  out of headroom.  Major coordinating  and loss
allocation  problems  also arise if insolvent  firms
Despite the increase in competition  that  have multi-state  operations. To cope with these
has  resulted  from  the  deregulation of  the  problems, there are proposals  to create national
industry,  the  Mexican  market  is  still  guarantee  funds.  However, these would imply
characterized  by high concentration. Although  federal regulation  of insurance  and any progress
a concentrated  market may exhibit  a high degree  is likely  to be slow. Other proposals  include  the
of competition, allowing more liberal domestic  removal  of  coverage  from  sophisticated
entry would increase pressure for competitive  corporate  buyers  of insurance  and the assessment
behavior. Thus, the Mexican  authorities  need  to  of risk-related  premiums that would depend on
limit  discretion  in applying  the new authorization
21the  degree  of  riskiness  of  operations and  markets, is to discourage  the offer of deceptively
investment  portfolios.  low-priced  contracts.
Canada  has a privately-run  guarantee  fund  Prior  to  1990,  Mexican  insurance
for  life  and  health  insurance  - known as  companies  were subject to a wide array of price
CompCorp.  This  is mutually owned by  its  and product controls. Tariffs required the prior
member companies,  is funded with assessments  approval  of the regulatory  agency  and, although
levied on its members  and covers  policies issued  some differentiation  was allowed between life
for residents and up to clearly specified limits  companies,  there was in general little room for
per  policyholder  per  member  company.  competition and innovation.  In property and
CompCorp  covers both life and annuity  policies  casualty  business,  a  single  tariff  for  all
and both individual  and group business.  companies was in  force and no discounts or
rebates were permitted. Moreover,  approvals  of
There do not appear to be any guarantee  tariff changes  were often subject to long delays
funds for nonlife insurance in Canada, while  that affected  the performance  of the industry in
insurance guarantee funds for  either  life  or  the face of the accelerating  inflation  of the mid-
nonlife business have  yet  to  established in  1980s.  Because of these delays, prices were
Mexico.  However, to  ensure a level playing  sometimes  increased  without authorization.
field and protect the competitive  position  of the
Mexican  market, prompt action may need  to be  Since  the reform  of regulations,  insurance
taken  in  establishing appropriate guarantee  companies are  free  to  fix  their  prices  and
funds.  develop new products, but they are required to
file any chan2es with the regulatory agency at
Other Regulatory Issues  least 30 days prior to their use (except  for large
risks where no  filing is  required).  Market
The following  specific  points also deserve  sources  indicate  dramatic  reductions  in the prices
consideration in  eliminating impediments to  of some lines of business,  although  without  hard
competition.  price  data  it  is  difficult to  document these'
claims.
Premium  Regulation.  Insurance
regulation  has  traditionally  followed  two  Data  compiled by  insurance brokers
approaches. One approach  has emphasized  the  BMZ, the local affiliate  of Marsh & McLennan,
fixing of premiums  at levels  that are adequate  to  show that the premiums  for home  insurance  (fire
pay future claims and avoid insolvencies,  while  and extended  coverage  for building  and contents)
the alternative  approach has relied on solvency  fell from 1.4 per mil to 1.1 per mil (a reduction
monitoring.  of  22%).  In  commercial fire  and  theft
insurance,  the reduction  in premiums  was nearly
Erring  on  the  side  of  caution, price  30%, while even greater reductions  occurred in
controls tend to fix premiums at high levels.  industrial risks.  However, motor  insurance
Insurance  companies  then tend  to return some of  became more expensive in  view of  the big
the excess prices in premium rebates and/or to  increase in loss ratios.  In fact, rates for motor
engage in nonprice competition, especially by  insurance  more than doubled  between 1989 and
mounting  more aggressive  and lavish marketing  1991.  Market practitioners from US brokers
campaigns and paying higher commissions  to  and companies with active involvement in the
selling  agents.  The  main  rationale  for  Mexican  market compare the recent changes  to
controlling prices, an approach that has long  those that occurred in the Chilean market after
been followed in Germany  and other European  the insurance reform of 1981.1
countries  with large and generally  quite efficient
22In  Canada, insurance companies have  ratios  stipulate  that  solvency  margins  for
long enjoyed freedom in setting  their prices and  property and casualty insurance should be the
developing their  products.  The  regulatory  highest  of either 22.8% of retained  premiums  or
tradition has been similar to that prevailing in  35% of retained losses.  For motor insurance,
Britain,  which  grants  insurance  companies  the corresponding  ratios are 32.5% and 45.8%.
"freedom  with responsibility  and disclosure".
In  Canada, solvency regulation is well
In the United States,  most state regulators  established  although  solvency  margins  are
allow price freedom and product innovation  to  mostly set by provincial authorities.  US state
insurance  companies, although  some  states  regulators also place increasing emphasis on
impose limits on increases in premium rates for  solvency monitoring.  Under the aegis of the
some lines of business, such as in particular  National  Association  of  Insurance
motor  insurance.'  Alternatively, insurance  Commissioners  (NAIC),  model  laws  and
regulators may impose rate-of-return  limits.  In  regulations have been developed that  include
many cases, such intervention is prompted by  IRIS  (Insurance  Regulatory  Information  System),
consumer pressure  as  in  the  well  known  a computer-based  system  of solvency  monitoring
"Proposition  103" in California.21  that  is  based  on  an  array  of  financial and
solvency ratios that are reported regularly to
To  allow greater scope for competition  both NAIC and the respective  state regulators.
and product innovation  in the Mexican  market,  IRIS  calculates  financial  ratios  for  each
the authorities should eliminate the filing and  insurance  company that  measure  solvency,
approval requirement.  The law  should also  liquidity, profitability  and  other  aspects of
clearly  recognize the  primacy  of  solvency  insurance  operations. They serve as preliminary
monitoring,  which can be used for discouraging  tests  of  financial  condition  and  identify
irresponsible competition and  the  offer  of  companies  whose  ratios are not within  acceptable
deceptive  policies.  ranges  and  thus  require  further  regulatory
attention.
Solvency Regulation.  The  alternative
approach  to insurance  regulation, which is now  Although  the  new  solvency margins
finding greater favor with regulatory  authorities  appear to satisfy the basic requirements of  a
around  the  world,  is  based  on  solvency  solvency-based system  of  regulation,  the
monitoring, whereby insurance companies are  Mexican authorities should elaborate further
required to maintain adequate  technical reserves  their  methodologies for  valuing  assets  and
and solvency margins that are based both on  assessing  risks. Moreover,  the solvency  margins
premiums  and on claims. In this way, insurance  should  be kept under review  to ensure that they
companies that engage in too aggressive  price  reflect changes in loss experience and do not
competition and offer deceptive packages are  impose an  unnecessary burden  on  Mexican
caught by the claims-based  solvency margins  insurers.  Assets  and  liabilities,  including
that depend on the loss experience  of the lines  technical  reserves and capital, should be valued
they write.  at  market  prices  to  the  maximum extent
possible.
Mexican  insurance regulation is  now
firmly based on solvency monitoring.  Again,  Investment  Regulations.  The regulation
US market practitioners consider  the regulation  of investments is an integral part of solvency
setting out the minimum  solvency  margins as a  monitoring  that aims to ensure the soundness  of
model regulation, combining the use of both  insurance  companies  and safeguard  the interests
premium-based  and  claims-based solvency  of policyholders. However, in many countries
margins.  For instance, the required minimum  investment controls have been used to  make
23insurance  companies  a captive  source of funds to  monitoring  approach. This is likely to affect the
finance large public deficits or to direct their  investment  yield  of  Mexican  insurance
funds into high priority sectors, such as export  companies and  to  weaken their  competitive
industries  and housing.  position in the integrated  insurance market that
is likely to emerge from the implementation  of
The  main  objective  of  investment  NAFTA.  Moreover, as discussed in Section  6,
regulations should not be the subsidization of  these minimum  requirements  have important  tax
particular activities with low-cost  funds but the  implications.
prudent diversification  of risks.  To this end,
investment  regulations should place maximum  Another issue in investment  rules is the
limits on investment  assets by broad category  of  limit on foreign assets.  Currently, insurance
risk.  Minimum requirements should not be  companies  are not allowed to invest in overseas
used.  markets.  However, consideration should be
given to allowing investment  in foreign assets,
Prior to  1990, investment  regulations in  especially  default-free  and liquid securities  in US
Mexico were unclear and restrictive. Although  and  Canadian markets.  This  would allow a
they were supposed  to protect the real value of  better diversification  of risks and could  also lead
assets  to back  both the technical  reserves and the  to a higher overall return, although the latter
equity  capital of  insurers,  in  practice they  would  depend  on the differentials  in real rates of
imposed  limits that had the opposite  effect. For  return.
instance, insurance  companies  were required to
invest 30% of their reserves in nonmarketable  In  Canada,  insurance  companies are
government securities yielding below market  subject to investment  regulations for prudential
rates of return.  When inflation  took off in the  purposes.  The approach adopted in Canada is
1980s, these holdings yielded highly negative  more restrictive  than that followed  in Britain. A
real rates of return.  The investment  regulations  major difference  is the imposition  of restrictions
were  modified  after  1985  when  insurance  on investments  in overseas markets. In Britain,
companies  were allowed  to place any increase  in  insurance companies  are free to diversify their
their mandatory investments  at market rates of  assets  by instrument,  sector and country, subject
interest.  In  1989, insurance companies were  to  a general requirement to  satisfy regulators
further allowed to  place all their  mandatory  about the prudent valuation of assets and the
investments in  marketable securities yielding  adequacy of reserves.  In Canada, strict ratios
market rates of interest  that were highly positive  are imposed that limit investments in foreign
in real terms.  markets,  real estate, equities, etc.  For instance,
Canadian life  insurance companies are  not
Mexican insurance companies are  now  allowed to invest more than 25% of their funds
subject to  investment regulations that broadly  in equities  or more than 10% in directly owned
reflect a proposal put forward by AMIS, the  real  estate.  They are also  required to  hold
Mexican  insurance  association,  regarding  the use  domestic  assets  to  match  their  domestic
of risk-based  capital  requirements  for investment  liabilities.
assets.  This  is  also  considered as  a  model
regulation  by US market practitioners.  In  the  United  States,  investment
regulations  differ between  states. The insurance
The regulatiow-  impose  maximum  limits  department of  New  York  state,  which  is
by  type  of  asset,  except for  a  continuing  generally considered to  impose very  tough
minimum 30%  requirement for  government  prudential controls, imposes limits on holdings
securities.  However, a minimum ratio is not  of  foreign assets and  foreign equities.  The
fully  compatible with  an  effective solvency  approach favored by NAIC applies risk-based
24weights on different assets and requires higher  owned by domestic insurance companies. The
coverage by capital and reserves of more risky  purpose  of such restrictions  is twofold:  to reduce
assets.  Under  the  NAIC  approach,  life  the outflow  of foreign currency and to promote
insurance companies  must maintain mandatory  the development  of the local market.  Although
securities  valuation  reserves (MSVR)  that range  many countries allow domestic insurers to seek
from 1% for high quality bonds  to 20% for low  coverage in the foreign reinsurance market if
quality bonds and for equities.  local reinsurance  is unavailable, the strong bias
in favor of local reinsurance often results in
The investment  regulations  should  impose  large losses  and inadequate  coverage of risks.
maximum  limits  to  ensure  adequate
diversification  of risks. The Mexican  authorities  Foreign  reinsurers are usually  required  to
should  consider  abolishing  the  minimum  be  registered  and  authorized  to  accept
requirement  for  investment in  government  reinsurance for domestic risks.  In the United
securities.  They  should  also  consider  States  and  Canada,  domestic  insurers  are
introducing  valuation  and risk-based investment  allowed to reinsure with unauthorized  foreign
reserves that are more in line with those applied  reinsurers, but  they are not  allowed to  take
in  Canada and the  United States as  well as  credit in their solvency  ratios for such business.
permitting investment  in default-free  and liquid
US and Canadian securities to  start with, and  In Mexico, reinsuring with unauthorized
later  on  expanding to  othei  well  reputed  foreign  reinsurers is not allowed. But following
markets.  the losses suffered in the aftermath  of the 1985
earthquake,  the Mexican  authorities  have relaxed
Reinsurance,  The  regulation  of  the  previously tight  restrictions on  foreign
reinsurance is one  of  the most  controversial  reinsurance.  Minimum retention ratios have
issues  in  the  international  regulation  of  been removed, although primary insurers are
insurance. The main purpose of reinsurance  is  expected  to have  a local bias in their reinsurance
to spread the insured risks.  This can take place  programs.
either through domestic reinsurance or through
foreign  reinsurance. The latter is very important  One  issue that  concerns the  Mexican
for  covering  catastrophic  risks,  such  as  authorities as well as the authorities of other
earthquakes  and other natural  disasters. In large  countries is the practice of  "fronting".  This
countries, such as the United States, domestic  involves  the use of local subsidiaries  of foreign
reinsurance  can be very effective  for most types  insurance companies as  generators of  local
of  risks and  in  fact, there  is a  considerable  insurance policies that are then automatically
exchange  of  insurance  portfolios  among  reinsured with the parent company overseas.
domestic  reinsurance groups  in  the  United  One way to tackle these  problems is to introduce
States.  regulations that  require  a  diversification of
reinsurance so that no  local subsidiary of  a
In  countries  with  smaller  or  less  foreign insurer would  be allowed to place all its
developed markets,  the  ability  of  the  local  reinsurance  business  with its parent company.
reinsurance market to  spread risks  is  more
limited and this  calls for greater reliance on  Another  concern,  which  is  more
foreign reinsurance. However, many countries  pronounced  in the United States, is the possible
that have a much smaller market  than the United  use of brokers both in primary insurance and in
States  impose  minimum  local retention  ratios and  reinsurance as a means of placing substandard
require primary insurers to reinsure with state-  business, delaying the reporting of  premiums
owned  reinsurance  companies  or  with  and losses, and failing  to establish  adequate  loss
reinsurance  companies  that  are  collectively  reserves.  Because such  improprieties have
25played a prominent  part in recent insolvencies  in  The  organization of  the  distribution
the United States, the NAIC has created two  system  has  important  implications for  the
Model  Acts,  the  Reinsurance Intermediaries  functioning of  insurance markets.  There  is
Model Act and the Managing General Agents  growing evidence  that direct mailers incur lower
Model Act,  that  aim to  establish minimum  costs than direct writers who, in  turn,  incur
requirements  for  the  relationship  between  lower costs than agency companies. The main
primary insurers, intermediaries  and reinsurers.  difference  is the level of commissions,  although
this is partly offset by the higher overhead  costs
To improve the efficiency  of the market,  incurred by direct mailers and direct writers.
the Mexican  authorities  should remove any bias  For the United States, market estimates  suggest
in favor of local reinsurance. To discourage  the  that  the  cost  of  selling  whole-life policies
practice of  "fronting",  a  requirement for  a  through agents may be one-third to two-thirds
diversification  of reinsurance  could  be imposed.  more  expensive  than  selling  th:ough
Moreover, as in the case of primary insurers,  stockbrokers, and up to twice as expensive as
greater cooperation  and exchange  of information  selling directly to the customer.  For annuities,
with regulatory authorities in  other countries,  the cost of selling through life insurance  agents
and especially Canada and the United States,  is 6-6.5%, about 5% through stockbrokers,  4%
would be required.  through banks and perhaps 2.5-3% through a
direct-mail  mutual fund.'
Distribution  Systems.  Distribution  plays
a very important part in the insurance sector,  These differences in selling costs, which
mainly  because  insurance,  especially  life  imply some important economies of scale and
insurance, is a service that is sold rather than  scope, explain the strong interest of banks to
bought. In all three countries,  insurance  brokers  expand  into  insurance  operations  and  sell
and intermediaries  need to  be registered with  insurance products through their branches and
regulatory  authorities,  which in the United  States  by direct mail.  However, in both Canada and
and  Canada means  the  state  or  provincial  the United States, there is strong resistance by
departments  of insurance. Regulation  of brokers  independent  insurance  brokers  to allowing  banks
may include proof of professional qualification  to  enter the insurance broking business.  For
(by  examination or  experience),  minimum  instance,  in  Canada,  banks  are  allowed to
working  capital  and  solvency  margins,  expand  into  insurance  through  separate
professional  indemnity  insurance  and  an  subsidiaries  of financial  holding companies,  but
adequate  system of client accounting.  they are barred from selling insurance  products
through their branches.  In the United States,
In  general,  there  are  four  types  of  state-chartered banks are  allowed in  several
distribution  systems:  independent  multiple  agents  states to sell insurance  products either by direct
who  sell  the  products of  many companies;  mail or  through their  branches and  also  to
exclusive  or tied agents who sell the products  of  engage  in  insurance  underwriting  through
only one  company; salaried employees (also  subsidiaries but  national banks are  not  yet
known as  direct  writers);  and  mail  order  authorized  to do so.
insurers.  Indepeadent  brokers are presumed  to
sell to  consumers the best products for their  In both Canada and the United States,
needs and  to  offer  best  advice, although in  direct writers and direct mail insurers  have been
practice  the advice  of brokers may be influenced  gaining market share at the expense of agency
by  the  commission they  earn  on  different  companies. In Mexico, independent  brokers are
products.  In  the  other  three  systems, the  still the  most  important distribution system.
products of  only one  company or  group of  Many of  the  leading insurance brokers  are
related companies  are sold.  affiliates of large international  groups, such as
26Marsh &  McLennan.  However,  exclusive  on all types of systems (including  direct writers
agencies as well as direct writing are on the  and direct mailers) to disclose  to policyholders
increase  and  are  likely  to  become  more  all commissions  and other distribution  costs.
important  in the future.
Other  Regulatory  Issues.  Another
The independent  agency system has been  regulatory issue concerns limitations on public
criticized as inefficient and expensive because  sector procurement of insurance.  In Mexico,
agents have an incentive to sell the insurance  state-owned  firms currently  enjoy  sizable  captive
policy  with  the  highest  commissions.'0  markets in the public sector.  A level playing
Because  of this, many countries  impose  limits on  field between state and private insurers would
commissions  although  such limits have adverse  require  elimination  of  these  captive
effects  on  competition.  In  recent  years,  arrangements. Permitting  private Mexican  firms
insurance companies have been allowed to set  to  compete for  public sector business would
their  commissions but  insurance agents are  allow them to reap greater economies of scale
required  to  disclose  to  policyholders  the  and thus become  more efficient  and able to meet
commission  they earn on different policies.  In  the challenge  of foreign competition.
Britain,  insurance agents must  also  indicate
clearly  whether  they operate as exclusive  agents  Private insurers business  opportunities  in
selling  the products of a single  group or whether  Mexico are  also  constrained by  the  Social
they act as independent  multiple agents. In the  Security  System  (SSS).  By  providing
latter case, they are expected  to offer best advice  comprehensive  health and disability  insurance  it
and to disclose their commissions. In Mexico,  competes  with  private  providers.  The
commissions used  to  be  regulated but  an  contractual  savings study  suggests  reforming  the
efficient market should only provide for full  SSS.31  It  recommends restricting the SSS at
disclosure.  providing basic coverage to  comply with the
minimum  requirements  of a safety net program,
The structure of the distribution system  while  supplementary health  and  disability
has important  implications  for the prospects of  coverage  should be provided  by private insurers.
international  trade in insurance. A market that  In  addition,  the  study  suggests introducing
is dominated by  exclusive agents and  direct  compulsory  complementary  term life insurance
writers is more difficult to penetrate than one  for workers  and issuing  secondary  regulations  on
where there is a substantial independent  broking  insurance company competence on  providing
network.  New foreign insurers will be able to  pension plans.  Adopting these reforms would
gain market access more cheaply and quickly if  expand  market  opportinities  for  insurance
they sell through existing  multiple agents  than if  companies allowing them  to  exploit  furfier
they  have  to  set  up  their  own  distribution  economies  of scale.
network  of  exclusive  agents.  However,
insurance regulations should favor  the most  Supervision  of Insurance
efficient  distribution  system and this would call
for  permitting exclusive agencies and  direct  The supervision  of insurance  operations  is
writing even  if  such  a  system puts  foreign  based  in  all  three  countries  on  off-site
companies  at a cost disadvantage.  surveillance  through  detailed  computerized
analysis of financial reports that are submitted
In Mexico, the distribution system is not  on a regular basis.  Detailed  on-site inspection
yet fully developed. The regulatory framework  of accounting  and other records is effected at
should  not  discriminate  between  different  infrequent  intervals, ranging from 3 to 5 years,
systems.  Limits on  commissions should be  unless a company is revealed  to be in financial
removed, but a requirement should be imposed  trouble by the analysis of its solvency ratios,
27when detailed  examinations  and close  regulatory  Strengthening  the  effectiveness  of
action are undertaken.  supervision  is of paramount importance  for the
functioning  of a system of regulation based on
In Mexico, the supervision  of insurance  solvency  monitoring.  Greater cooperation  and
companies is  entrusted  with  the  Comision  exchange of information with the supervisory
Nacional  de Seguros  y Fianzas (CNSF). CNSF  authorities of  Canada and  the United States
has already developed a sophisticated  computer  would  also  be  essential.  The  Mexican
model that analyses in great detail the financial  authorities should also  consider the need for
performance  and solvency  margins  of insurance  establishing guarantee funds to  safeguard the
companies.  CNSF is also empowered  to take  interests of small policyholders and protect the
drastic action against  companies  that do not meet  competitive  position of the Mexican  market.
the specified minimum  requirements. Already,
one company has been ordered to  increase its  Operating Efriciency
reserves to  comply with the solvency margin
regulations.  The  measurement and  comparison of
efficiency in  insurance are as difficult as  in
In  Canada,  insurance  supervision is  banking.  International  comparisons  are
shared  between  the  provincial  and  federal  complicated  by  differences  in  accounting
governments.  In  1987,  the  Office of  the  conventions,  market structure, business  mix and
Inspector General of  Banks and the  Federal  data coverage. A basic  problem, as in banking,
Department  of Insurance  were consolidated  into  is the lack of a satisfactory  definition  of output.
a new Office of the Superintendent  of Financial  Traditional definitions of insurance output are
Institutions  (OSFI).  OSFI has full supervisory  based on premium income, but this is a revenue
responsibilities  for all chartered banks and for  rather than an output measure and depends as
federally  incorporated  nonbank  financial  much on  changes in prices as on changes in
intermediaries,  including insurance companies,  quantities.
trust and loan companies,  and cooperative  credit
associations.  However,  responsibility  for  General insurance companies use four
supervising insurance  companies is shared with  main  ratios  as  measures of  efficiency and
the  provincial  authorities.  The  role  of  performance.  The  loss ratio,  which relates
CompCorp in the supervisory arrangements  is  losses  to earned  premiums,  shows  the percentage
unclear.  of premiums  that are paid back to the insured in
the form of claims for losses. Because  payments
In the United  States, NAIC  plays a central  for  losses may be  spread over  a  number of
part in analyzing the financial performance  of  years,  insurance companies make transfers to
companies  with  multi-state  operations.  loss reserves to cover  future  payments. The loss
However, NAIC is a voluntary association of  ratio also includes  the loss adjustment  expenses.
state commissioners  and has no statutory  power  Differences  in  reserving  policies  and
to intervene.  NAIC relies on moral suasion in  manipulation of  reserves  for  tax  and  other
trying  to  improve  solvency monitoring and  purposes  reduce the usefulness  of this index of
supervisory standards.  In recent years, it has  efficiency.  The expense ratio is computed as
tried to  develop an  accreditation system that  administration  costs plus commissions  paid on
rates  state  insurance  departments by  the  sales less commissions  received from reinsurers
effectiveness of  their  regulatory  standards.  as  a  percentage of  direct  premiums.  This
NAIC granted accreditation to  the  insurance  provides a measure of the acquisition  costs of
departments of  New  York  (traditionally the  insurance  business. The combined  ratio, which
toughest  in  the  country)  and  Florida  in  is  often  used  as  a  measure  of  insurance
December 1990.  profitability, is  the  sum  of  the  two  ratios.
28Finally, the operating ratio takes account  of the  In Canada, general insurance companies
investment  income earned on loss reserves by  operated with an average loss ratio over the 3-
deducting  the investment  income ratio from the  year period 1987-89 of 76%.  Their expense
combined  ratio.  ratio was 31%, giving  a combined  ratio of 107%
and an underwriting loss of 7%.  Investment
Traditionally,  insurance  companies  aimed  income amounted to  18% of premiums so that
to earn a 5% profit on their premiums without  net income before taxes was equal to  11% of
taking account of investment  income.  With an  premiums. However, the ratio of premiums to
average leverage of premiums  over equity of 3,  equity  amounted to  only  1.35  in  Canada,
this resulted in a satisfactory  return on equity of  resulting in a ROE of 15%.
15%.  This  approach made sense when loss
reserves were low in relation to total equity and  In Mexico, the average loss ratio for all
when inflation and nominal rates of return on  nonlife lines between 1985 and 1989 was 80%
investment  assets were also low.  But over the  of earned premiums.  The expense ratio was a
years  the  growing  complexity of  general  very high 43%",  giving a  combined ratio of
insurance business has led to the building of  123% and an underwriting loss of 23%.  But
larger loss reserves 32, while the high inflation  investment income corresponded to  61%  of
experience  of  the  1970s  forced  insurance  premiums, a result of the very  high nominal
companies to take into account the investment  rates of return prevailing in  Mexico during a
income on  their assets and to  charge lower  period of very high inflation. Nonlife business
premiums on their policies.  The practice of  generated a net income  before taxes of 38% of
cashflow  underwriting  has resulted  in companies  earned premiums.  However, the reported net
incurring underwriting  losses which were more  income  before  taxes was  23%, because  insurance
than made up by investment  income.  companies have been allowed to set aside tax-
free precautionary reserves equal to  10% of
Available  data  show  substantial  retained  premiums. Mexican  companies  are not
differences  in  the  loss  ratios  and  financial  required to segregate their capital accounts and
performance of  insurance companies in  the  thus it is not possible to calculate  separately  the
United States, Canada and Mexico, although  ROE on nonlife insurance  operations.
great caution  is needed  in interpreting  these data
because  of  the  differences  in  accounting  In  all countries, substantial differences
conventions  and business  mix mentioned  above.  exist in the performance  ratios of different lines
of business. There are various reasons for this.
The loss ratio for all nonlife lines of US  Some lines  incur high  loss ratios  but  have
companies was 83% over the five year-period  relatively few underwriting  costs.  Professional
1984-88,  while  the  expense  ratio  reached  lines, such as medical malpractice, fall under
27%.3  The  combined  ratio  was  110%,  this  category.  Other lines, especially motor
implying  an  underwriting  loss  of  10%.  insurance, have both  high  loss and  expense
Insurance  companies earned  net  investment  ratios, mainly because  they involve compulsory
income equal to  17% of premiums so that the  insurance and there is consumer resistance to
net  result before taxes  amounted to  7%  of  higher premium rates.  Finally,  some lines
premiums. With a ratio of premiums  to equity  involve  weaker  consumer  resistance  to high costs
of  1.75,  the  average return  on  equity was  and  low  loss  ratios.  Fire  insurance and
11  %.3  But the ROE fluctuated widely over  homeowners multiple  perils  fall  under  this
this period, ranging  from 2% in 1984  to 19% in  category. Loss ratios  varied in the United  States
1987.  from 56% for fire and 72% for homeowners
multiple perils to 93% for motor insurance and
128% for medical malpractice. In Canada, loss
29ratios varied from 63% for personal lines to  The  results of  the  combined life  and
91%  for  motor insurance.  In  Mexico, the  nonlife  business  of Mexican  insurance  companies
average loss ratio for fire insurance was 49%  show investment income of 50%,  a total loss
against 93% for motor insurance. The fire loss  ratio of 809%,  an expense ratio of 43% and a net
ratio fluctuated  widely. It was 99% in 1985, the  income ratio of 27%.  With a ratio of premiums
year of the earthquake,  against less than 40% in  to average total equity (reported equity capital
all other years.  plus precautionary  reserves) of 1.7, the nominal
return on average equity was 44.4%.  This is
Performance  in life insurance  is generally  considerably greater than the  rates of  return
more  stable than  in  nonlife business.  But  achieved by  US  and  Canadian  companies.
because life insurance is  based on long-term  However, annual inflation in Mexico averaged
contracts,  it  is  affected  more  by  the  55% between 1985 and  1989, so  that  their
accumulation  of reserves.  In th- United  States,  effective  real ROE  before asset revaluation  gains
investment income over the  five-year period  was  substantially negative.  The  nominal
1985-89 corresponded to  47%  of premiums.  revaluation  gains amounted  on average to 28%,
Benefits  and dividends  paid to policyholders  and  so that the real ROE was 17%.  This figure is
additions to technical reserves, which over the  not comparable  to the return rates shown for US
long run represent the premiums paid back to  and Canadian  companies,  which are expressed  in
policyholders,  amounted  to 119% of premiums.  nominal terms and do not take account of both
Expenses and commissions absorbed 23% of  inflation  and asset revaluation  gains.
premiums, leaving a net income before taxes of
5% of premiums. With a ratio of premiums  to  The above data show that Mexican firms
equity of 2.9, life insurance  companies  achieved  exhibited  both higher expense  and profit ratios,
a ROE of 13.8%.  a result that can be attributed  partly to the very
high rate of inflation  that prevailed  in Mexico  in
Canadian  life insurance  companies  had an  the mid-1980s,  partly to the real rates of interest
even greater  investment income of  67%  of  in  1988 and 1989 and partly to the protection
premiums.  Total  benefits to  policyholders,  afforded  Mexican  firms  by  the  regulatory
including  additions  to reserves, corresponded  to  framework that  prevailed until  1989.  As
128%  of premiums,  while  underwriting  expenses  inflation and real interest rates come down to
were equal to 31  %, leaving a net income  before  more moderate  levels  and deregulation  opens the
taxes of 9%.  Canadian  life insurance  companies  market  to  greater  competition,  Mexican
have a very low ratio of premiums  to equity of  insurance  companies  will have to improve their
only 0.9 and as a result their pre-tax ROE was  performance and achieve operating ratios that
only 7.7%.  are more in line with those of their counterparts
in Canada  and the United States.
In Mexico, life insurance  achieved  a pay-
back ratio of 78% over the 5-year period 1985-  This will bring considerable benefits to
89.  This includes  benefits  paid to policyholders  the  customers of  insurance companies, will
and additions  to technical  reserves. The expense  lower the costs of insurance for industrial and
ratio  was 44% of  retained premiums.  The  commercial companies, and will increase the
investment income of life companies was on  welfare of consumers  both by lowering  the cost
average 38% of premiums, a level that was in  of insurance  and by encouraging  an expansion  of
fact substantially  lower than that of property and  the insurance habit.  Like banking, insurance
casualty lines.  The net income  before taxes as  services are intermediate  goods for producers
a proportion  of net retained  premiums  was 16%.  and final goods for consumers.  Any reduction
in their cost will enhance efficiency in industry
and commerce  and increase consumer welfare.
30The Transition Process  the life insurance and pension business without
adequate safeguards about the  solvency and
In  general, the authorities of different  integrity  of the institutions  involved. This will
countries can adopt various policies to  ensure  require greater international  cooperation  among
that the benefits of foreign participation  exceed  regulatory and supervisory  authorities.
the costs, such as requiring a diversification  of
reinsurance and  increasing the  exchange of  The  more liberal  attitude  of  national
relevant information  with supervisors in other  authorities  towards entry of  foreign insurance
countries.  As  already  discussed in  earlier  companies is  shown by  the share of  foreign
chapters, realization  of the potential  net benefits  companies  in  the  generation  of  insurance
depends on  the  regulatory environment.  A  premiums.  Among OECD countries, in  life
competitive  but properly supervised system is  business,  this ranges from 10% in Germany  and
more  likely  to  produce net benefits than  a  Spain  to  16%  in  Australia,  21%  in  the
system that is oppressed  by detailed  controls  on  Netherlands, 29%  in  Austria  and  51%  in
products, prices and market shares. In the latter  Portugal. In nonlife  business,  foreign  companies
case, the most likely outcome is that foreign  generally controlled a  bigger  share  of  the
companies will simply grab a big share of the  market, ranging  from 14% in Germany to 23%
economic  rents enjoyed  by domestic companies.  in Portugal, 24% in the Netherlands, 27% in
New Zealand, 37% in Spain, 46% in Austria
Most developed  and developing  countries  and 54% in Australia (1988).36 These shares
have adop(ed a more liberal attitude to foreign  are generally much greater than those found in
insurance companies  than to foreign banks.  In  banking  markets.
part,  this  may be  explained by  the  greater
concern to maintain  control over monetary and  Opening  up a domestic market to foreign
credit policy and over the functioning of the  competition  can take many different  forms. The
payment system.  But in part it may also be  first form is to permit the cross-border  provision
explained by  the  complexity of  insurance  of insurance services.  As already noted, this
business and by the fact that a relatively small  requires  adequate protection of  nonresident
number  of  people  had  any  dealings  with  policyholders by  the  authorities of  foreign
insurance  companies.  markets by supervising closely companies that
may  specialize in  selling  insurance in  less
Technology  transfer is very important  in  developed insurance markets and by extending
general  insurance  where  business  is  quite  coverage  of guarantee  funds  to policies issued  to
complex and risks are often difficult to assess.  nonresident  policyholders.
In life insurance, where contracts are long-term
and may generate  substantial  long-term  savings,  A second form is to allow joint ventures
there has been greater concern about control  and  minority  participation  in  domestic
over  the  utilization of  such  funds and  less  companies. Allowing  minority participation  of
willingness  to allow foreign  companies  to play a  between 30% and  49%  is likely to  produce
big  part in  this  market.  It  is  likely that a  many of the potential benefits of foreign entry,
substantial expansion  of long-term savings and  especially  if the sector is free from product and
personal pension plans will accentuate  concern  price controls, is subject to a market-based  and
about  ensuring  adequate  control  over  the  effective system of prudential regulation and
utilization  and  safety  of  long-term  funds.  supervision, and allows liberal domestic entry.
Although  the need for greater risk diversification  Mexico has  already authorized 49%  foreign
will call  for  allowing investments in  foreign  participation  and has made considerable  progress
assets, national authorities will be reluctant to  in  reforming  the  regulation  of  insurance
permit foreign companies to play a big part in  business. The benefits  of foreign participation  -
31greater  competition,  lower  prices,  better  broadly similar level of development  and their
products - are already evident in the market.  closer integration is not likely to create major
problems.
However,  large companies  in Canada  and
the  United  States  have  a  strong  cultural  For Mexico, market integration through
preference for total ownership and control over  NAFTA will pose a  greater challenge.  The
their foreign operations. Denying either 100%  Mexican  authorities  need  to  take  various
foreign ownership or  local presence through  measures to  enhance the  ability of  the  local
branch operations will  deprive the  Mexican  market to compete  effectively with the US and
market of the potential  benefits  of a more closely  Canadian  markets. These include the following:
integrated North American insurance  market.
1.  Complete the reform of  regulatory
A possible solution could be  to  allow  framework  and  emphasize the  primacy  of
foreign companies  to establish  fully-owned  local  solvency  regulation  and monitoring. This would
subsidiaries but to require them to sell to the  involve the effective elimination  of any bias in
public a minority participation  once they reach  favor of domestic reinsurance and the adoption
a certain  size (expressed  in terms of total assets,  of a more liberal  policy on domestic  entry.
total equity or  total revenues).  In  addition,
limits on maximum  individual  shareholdings  in  2.  Strengthen  the supervisory  capabilities
very  large  companies  could  be  imposed.  of  regulatory agencies by hiring and training
Shareholding restrictions may dissuade some  qualified  staff, improving  regulatory incentives
firms from seeking further growth once they  and granting regulators necessary powers for
reached  a  certain  size.  Although  these  successful  intervention. Swift action to require
restrictions  may  prevent  companies  from  the recapitalization  of insurers with inadequate
exploiting  economies  of  scale  and  may  solvency margins will  be  needed to  prevent
discourage  them  from  transferring  the  insolvencies  and  losses  for  policyholders.
technology  that is adequate  for handling  a larger  Effective mechanisms to  facilitate the exit of
volume  of  transactions,  competition  and  failing companies, through either  merger or
contestability  would be unlikely to suffer much  closure, must also be developed.
in  a  market  with  liberal  entry  and  good
prudential  regulation  and supervision.  3.  To safeguard the interests of small
policyholders  and  protect  the  competitive
Conclusions and Recommendations  position of the Mexican market, consideration
should be  given to  the case for establishing
The  US-Canada FTA  has  adopted the  guarantee  funds.
principle of national treatment in the insurance
sector, which is covered under Chapter 13 that  4.  In addition to  encouraging  domestic
deals with services  generally  rather than Chapter  entry by applying  the authorization  criteria in a
17 that deals with the financial sector.  But  consistent and transparent way, the authorities
because insurance regulation is primarily the  would be expected,  as part of NAFTA, to allow
responsibility  of state and provincial  authorities,  a further opening of the market by authorizing
insurance  companies  will  face  many  the  establishment  of  fully-owned  local
impediments  due to the restrictions imposed  by  subsidiaries  and branches of US and Canadian
political subdivisions.  These restrictions  will not  firms.  This will stimulate  a greater integration
limit market access, but will cause additional  of the North American insurance  markets.  But
costs to be incurred by companies that wish to  greater integration  will also require progress in
operate in many states or provinces.  The US  resolving issues in  the taxation of  insurance
and Canadian  insurance markets  are already at a  companies in  different countries, the  cross-
32border provision of insurance  and the protection  involve the compulsory  sale to the public of a
of nraresidentpolicyholders. Supervision  of the  minimum part of their capital, while for very
institutions  also  have  to  be  coordinated  large companies specific limits on  individual
internationally.  shareholdings  could  also  be  introduced.
However, in accordance with the principle of
5.  An integrated  market will presuppose  national treatment enshrined in NAFTA, such
greater cooperation  and exchange  of information  shareholding  restrictions  should not discriminate
among the respective regulatory authorities to  against US and Canadian residents.  But  .se
ensure that individual insurers are prevented  restrictions  may  prevent  companies  from
from  exploiting  loopholes  in  prudential  exploiting  economies  of  scale  and  from
regulations  and  engaging  in  deceptive and  transferring  the technology  that is adequate  for
unsound  business  practices.  Consideration  handling  a larger volume of transactions.
should also be given to the case for organizing
joint training  programs to enhance  staff expertise  7.  One of the most difficult  and sensitive
and achieve greater consistency in  regulatory  issues  is the timing of the further opening  of the
approach.  market to  Canadian and US companies.  The
timing should  be determined  in connection  with
6.  The Mexican authorities  may wish to  the  period  needed  to  improve  further  the
impose restrictions on  shareholding  on firms  effectiveness  of supervision. Given the progress
above a clearly specified size.  These may  already  made,  a  relatively short  adjustment
period would probably  suffice.
33V.  SUBSECTOR  ISSUES:  SECURITIES  MARKET
Regulatory  Considerations  sectors of the economy  will be traded off against
changes  in the financial  sector.
The securities market as a subsector of
the Mexican financial system will inevitably  be  The regulation  of securities markets and
affected  by whatever  changes  in regulations  will  brokerage  houses is generally  mare restrictive  in
be  carried out  in  other parts of the system.  Mexico than  in  the  other  North  American
Mexico  stands  to gain substantially  from a closer  countries.  The emphasis is on restricting the
link with the more developed  markets,  especially  introduction of  new  instruments, regulating
because the basic precondition  for a flourishing  mutual funds' portfolios and limiting the scope
securities market is credibility  and stability.  of brokerage houses' activities.  However, in
recent years the authorities have moved to  a
The  National  Securities  Commission  more liberal approach,  at the same time trying to
(Comision Nacional de  Valores,  CNV)  has  strengthen supervision.  Major changes in the
already  established  a  close  consultative  respective  regulations  are  currently  being
relationship  with the US SEC.  A Memorandum  discussed.  In the following paragraphs only
of Understanding  has been signed formalizing  those issues that affect international securities
bilateral  cooperation  on  enforcement,  market  transactions  are  addressed.  The
information exchange and technical assistance.  discussion focuses on (i) market structure and
Further  substantial  topics  currently  u. der  barriers to  entry, (ii) other regulatory issues,
discussion between the two  agencies include  (iii)  establishing guarantee funds,  and  (iv)
recognition by  the  US  of  INDEVAL as  a  supervision  of securities markets.
designated  custodian  for  US  institutional
investors; simplified procedures for listing of  Market Structure and Barriers to Entry
Mexican securities on  US  stock  exchanges;
procedures for simultaneous  public offerings in  The present Mexican securities  market is
the two jurisdictions; simplified  procedures for  quite small compared to the USA and Canada
recognition  of  Mexican  brokerage  house  (Mexican  market capitalization  is approximately
subsidiaries in the US; and criteria that would  equal to .5 percent of U.S.  and 7 percent of
permit US brokerage  houses to participate  in the  Canadian  market capitalization). In Mexico  the
financial groups that are likely to be formed in  principal  providers of securities market services
Mexico as  a  result of  the  changes to  the  are brokerage houses, the stock exchange and
securities law enacted  in July 1990.  the clearing  house. But the main  occupation  and
source of income for each of these providers is
This  pattern  of  negotiated agreements  in fact the conduct  of the money  market, not the
between the relevant agencies is similar to that  long-term  securities  market.  The  former
between the USA and Canada.3  It is a process  accounts for nearly 90% of trades by volume
which  allows  careful  consideration of  the  and value.  This distinguishes  Mexico  from the
interplay  between  the  complex  regulatory  USA  and  Canada,  where  money  market
regimes in  each jurisdiction.  It  enables well  activities are generally conducted  off-exchange
thought-out adjustments to  be  made to  each  by counter-parties  or by banks as intermediaries.
regime which will bring desired efficiency  gains
without compromising investor protection and  The  general  opinion  in  the  Mexican
system  stability.  And  it  diminishes  the  securities industry is that the securities market
likelihood  that negotiated  liberalization  in other  will become increasingly  important and that the
34money  market  will  take  a  relatively  less  house  so  long  as  the  regulatory regime  is
important  position  in  the  medium  term.  equipped  to ensure compliancs.
Certainly interest rate and inflation rate trends
currently support such a shift, and Ministry of  Brokerage houses are  at  present  key
Finance and  CNV  policy is  to  expand the  market intermediaries and market makers in
securities  market,  especially  the  corporate  government  paper, although they are not long-
equities market.  term holders of  the  paper.  There  may be
concern that foreign ownership of brokers may
These trends may be accelerated  by the  leave the Government  vulnerable to artificially
opening up  of  the  real  economy to  foreign  created distortions in its market-based  financial
competition, the formation of financial groups  management  operations. This is not true for the
which will lead to brokerage house operations  same  reason  as  given  above  - domestic
being split into discrete subsidiary operations  regulation  should ensure proper prudential and
and  by  the  development of  the  role  of  conduct compliance  regardless  of the source of
institutional  investors in the market.  ownership. And growth in the long-term end of
the government  paper market has added to the
The positive  side of the existing  Mexican  Government's  protection  from short-term  market
situation is that brokerage houses are generally  movements.
well-capitalized  and profitable  and both the stock
exchange and clearing-house  are efficient and  Free capital movement and openness to
forward-looking. The negative  side is that none  foreign investment are  key  elements of  the
of these parties is greatly experieneed in the  Government's  implementation  of the 1988-1994
growing  area  of  high  value  sophisticated  National  Development Plan  and  should  be
securities market operations, especially  in long-  proscribed  only where national  interest  is clearly
term debt instruments  and equities.  at risk.  Foreign participation  in ownership of
brokerage houses does not of itself bring such
In  addition to  existing restrictions in  risks. The Government  could  remove entry and
licensing new brokerage houses, foreigners are  ownership  barriers,  perhaps  gradually  and
prohibited from owning more than 30% of a  conditionally, and  ensure  that  the  national
Mexican brokerage house  and  from  having  interest is protected.
control of the board irrespective of percentage
holding.  Brokerage  houses are one of the very  At the federal level the USA and Canada
few  industries so  protected.  The  CNV  is  allow free entry to the securities industry of
considering increasing the  number  of  new  foreign-owned  brokerage  houses  and investment
brokerage houses (there are 25 operating), but  banks.  Foreigners may hold shares in  local
the rules are not yet transparent and refusal of  brokerage houses without limit.  But  these
admission  seems to be left to the discretion of  freedoms  are proscribed  under laws operating in
CNV.  the States  and Provinces. This is not as serious
in the case of Canada as it is in the case of the
The  Mexican  government  is  rightly  USA.
concerned that  the  prudential and  conduct
supervision  of  brokers  operating  under  its  In  the USA, securities offered or  sold
jurisdiction  is  sufficient to  ensure  investor  within a state usually must be registered in that
protection  and system stability. But these aims  state,  as  must  broker-dealers,  investment
can  be  met  through  domestic  regulatory  advisers and  other persons in  the  securities
requirements  on new entrants irrespective  of the  business.  At  the  least  this  provides  an
source of investment capital in the brokerage  unnecessary duplication of  registration at  the
Federal level and at worst can act as a barrier to
35entry  by  foreign  brokerage  houses,  either  No significant  product, client  and location
explicitly  or  implicitly.  In  practice  these  barriers have been identified at the Provincial
barriers have worked to  the disadvantage of  level in Canada.
Mexican  brokerage houses,  especially those
wishing to operate in the border states of the  Instruments  Offered  and Traded. Articles
USA.  11 and 13 of the Securities Market Act prohibit
the public  offer and secondary  market trading  of
This  matter should be  raised with the  securities not listed in the National Registry of
USA Federal  Government  and the relevant  states  Securities and Intermediaries.  Article 14 sets
in order to achieve simplicity, uniformity and  out the general requirements for  registration.
compliance with  the  I  deral  Government's  The CNV  develops and  applies the  specific
national treatment approach.  It  is  probably  requirements which d" ive from these general
however that only minor improvements  will be  principles.
obtained because  of the constitutional  power of
the states in this area.  Securities  registered, offered  and traded in
foreign jurisdictions may be also registered in
The same topic should be examined in  the National Register for offer and trading in
relation to  Canada.  The Provincial-Federal  Mexico.  To obtain registration  the issues must
differences there are less than in the USA but  comply with all the requirements  of the CNV.
still  may  disadvantage Mexican  brokerage
houses.  Because  the Mexican  market is relatively
small,  the  cost  of  complying  with  the
Other Regulatory  Issues  requirements  tends to discourage  foreign issuers
from  seeking  Mexican registration.  As  a
Product.  Client and Location  Restrictions,  consequence, Mexican investment  and trade in
The source of investment  capital in a brokerage  those securities is conducted off-shore.  The
house should  not of itself determine  the products  Mexican market would benefit from having as
or clients the broker may deal with: domestic  much  of that business  as possible  brought home.
regulation  can  ensure  adequate  protection.
Restriction on  foreign  access to  clients  or  Domestic  trading  of securities  issued  abroad
products  unnecessarily limits  the  innovation  and unrestricted foreign placement of Mexican
potential inh-rent  in  opening the  market to  securities would be a  precondition for  a  full
foreign access.  integration  of securities markets.  Under these
conditions mutual fund shares would also be
At the Federal level the USA substantially  available  in  all  FTA  countries.  This  in
prohibits  commercial  banks from participating  in  particular could substantially  improve resource
the securities business, whereas Canada does  mobilization and  promote  equity  financing.
not.  However, it  would also  imply that  Mexican
mutual  fund  companies  must  be  free  to
At the state level in the USA, product,  determine  their portfolios  as it is the case in the
client and location restrictions are a significant  US and Canada.
barrier  to  operations by  Mexican brokerage
houses.  This should be raised with the USA  There are a number of difficult  problems
Federal Government  and the relevant  states.  It  to be resolved before the requirements for re-
is  probable  however  that  only  minor  registration  in Mexico can be modified.  These
improvements  will be obtained.  relate primarily  to differences  in accounting  and
disclosure requirements.  And there  may be
benefit in placing some general limit on access
36to automatic Mexican  registration, for example  The  CNV places these restrictions on
on the  basis of  a  well-established  record of  brokerage  houses in order to ensure that:
market liquidity  and business  history.
*  brokers do not trade against the
This topic should be examined  in regard  interests  of their own clients.
to  establishing some  form  of  reciprocal or
common  prospectus  agreement  between  Mexico,  *  trade in a way which may distort
the USA and Canada. It would be to Mexico's  the market; and
advantage  to  negotiate  an  agreement  on
multijurisdictional  offerings with both the USA  *  brokers  do  not  carry  a  large,
and Canada.  variable  and  inadequately
monitored  portfolio risk.
Voting  _)i:hts.  At present  foreign  holders
of  most  Mexican  corporate  equities  are  These  three objectives  -- protection  of the
precluded  from exercising  attached  voting  rights.  fiduciary  relationship  between  broker and client,
This  is  achieved  either  through  allowing  protection against  market manipulation, and
foreigners to  hold only non-voting shares or  maintenance  of strict prudential  control, can be
requiring that voting shares be held in trust by  achieved  in other ways.  The USA and Canada
NAFINSA  with all benefits except voting rights  achieve  the objectives  but they do not place the
flowing through to the foreign holder.  time period, counterparty  or holding limitations
of  Mexico.  Instead, the  USA and  Canada
One  benefit  of  having  substantial  require brokerage houses to  accurately value
institutional  holdings  of corporate  equities  is that  their securities holdings on a daily basis (mark
such investors can n.onitor the performance  of  to market) and tc adjust their capital position  to
company  management  and  exercise  some  maintain  the prescribed  prudential  ratios. These
influence  over management  decisions. Because  valuations are independently audited and  are
foreign investors are precluded from exercising  monitored by the regulatory authorities.  With
that influence  by way of voting rights they are  regard  to  trading,  the  authorities require  a
left with only the decision  to buy and sell as an  brokerage  house to disclose  to its client  when the
expression  of their assessment. This is a spur to  client's  order  is  traded  from  the  brokerage
greater market volatility and may therefore not  house's own account  and to disclose  to the stock
be desirable.  exchange  when  a large tranche  from the broker's
own account is traded.
Consideration  should  be given  to allowing
foreigners to  hold and exercise voting rights  There  may be  some value  in  Mexico
attached  to equities. This would be in line with  adopting a regime similar to the USA/Canada
the principle  of national  treatment.  one.  This would be in line with the market
liberalization po.icies of the Government.  It
Trading for  Own  Account  Mexican  could allow Mexican brokers to better compete
brokerage houses may hold and trade for their  with  their foreign  counterparts. Foreign brokers
own account  only those securities  allowed  by the  operating  in Mexico would of course be subject
CNV. In Circulars 10-126  and 10-118  the CNV  to whatever  rules apply in Mexico, but it could
prohibits the  direct  holding and  trading of  be argued  that their ability to trade in their home
variable  rate securities  such as corporate  equities  market,  without  the  Mexican  limits,
and places a strict time limit on the holding of  unnecessarily  diminishes  the competitive  power
fixed rate securities.  of Mexican  domestic  brokers.
37Before removing the present limits the  Supervision  of Securities Markets
CNV would need to be assured that:
In the US and Canada regulation  attempts
*  effective  portfolio  valuation  to  minimize  interference  with  contractual
mechanisms  are in place;  freedom.  Instead the  emphasis is  on  close
supervision  of market activities and strict rules
*  prudential  regulations  are effective  on accounting  and disclosure.  Self regulation
in  accounting  for  changing  plays an important  role in ensuring proper and
portfolio  values;  transparent  market  procedures.  However,
serious  restrictions towards  the  freedom to
*  there are effective reporting and  provide services result from political federalism
monitoring  procedures;  and, in the case of the US, from the sep1aration
of investment  and commercial  banking.  These
*  market  manipulation  is  not  restrictions also affect international securities
facilitated  by the use of brokerage  market transactions.
house account trading; and
With  the  implementation of  NAFTA
3  brokerage house clients are fully  Mexico  should  improve its prudential  regulation
aware  of the fact when  their broker  and monitoring  of brokerage  houses in the light
takes  the  other  side  of  any  of  more  complex cross-border,  intra-group,
transaction  with them and that the  term-related  and exchange rate risks which are
broker's fiduciary  responsibility  to  likely to arise.
the client is not compromised.
The Transition Process
Brokerage Commissions,  The  fixed
brokerage requirements for  secondary market  Mexico is likely to  reap benefits from
trading that used to exist in Mexico contrasted  continuing  with the process of liberalization it
with the negotiated  brokerage  rates which apply  has begun.  But the balance of benefit will be
in  the  USA  and  Canada.  Retaining fixed  determined to  a  considerable degree by  the
commissions  would have acted as a brake to  effectiveness  of domestic regulation in Mexico
competitive  pressures  for lowering  commissions  and by  the  extent to  which efficiencies and
on large trades.  The introduction  of negotiated  innovations  are transferred  to Mexico.
commissions  has removed this obstacle to the
integration  of the Mexican  market  with its North  In order to ensure that Mexico receives
American counterparts. Although  the levels of  the maximum  benefit from the liberalization it
commissions  have remained  the same, there is  may be appropriate  to implement  the necessary
little  doubt  that  with  growing  foreign  reforms in stages over time and to place some
participation,  they will be adjusted  downwards.  conditions  on implementation  of some reforms.
The advantage  of such an approach is that the
Establishing  Guarantee  Funds  domestic  financial  sector  may adjust  and position
itself  to compete  with the foreign entrants. The
To protect small unsophisticated  market  Government may  consider  that  this  is  an
participants consideration  may be given to the  important  objective. If so, freer domestic entry
establishment  of guarantee funds.  These funds  could  come  almost  immediately  together with  the
generally  cover losses  incurred  due to the failure  definition of  a  short  time  period to  allow
of brokerage institutions.  adjustment prior  to  complete opening of  the
market to foreign participation,  which could be
economically  justified  because  delay  in
38implementation  denies the cost saving and other  *  improved  prudential  regulation  and
benefits which will accrue to  the  real goods  monitoring  of brokerage houses in
sector.  the light of more complex cross-
border,  intra-group, term-related
In any case the Government  may wish to  and exchange rate risks which are
impose some conditions  on the authorization  of  likely to arise.
new foreign  entrants to ensure a diffusion  of the
technical and other skills which they can bring  *  improved  prudential  regulation  and
to Mexico. Such conditions  would not be in line  disclosure  requirements  to replace
with the principle of national treatment.  They  the present restrictions on brokers
could  be justified, however, on the grounds that  trading their own account.
they are temporary and will be superseded  at the
time that complete openness is achieved.  A  *  improved  arrangements  for
second  important justification  is  Mexico's  cooperative  monitoring
considerable  relative disadvantage  in the finance  investigation  and  enforcement
area  which  should  be  acknowledged and  activities  across borders, including
accounted  for  by  way  of  a  structured  information  exchange,  proceeds  of
developmental  effort.  crime sequestration, and methods
for  acting in  one jurisdiction to
Conclusions and Recommendations  prohibit a  cross  border  activity
conducted  there which is unlawful
In light of the above Mexico  should make  in the country across the border.
a commitment  in NAFTA to remove, in stages,
all barriers to entry by some agreed upon date,  *  more  detailed,  consistent  and
subject to  satisfactory performance of foreign  effective  rules  of  conduct  for
entrants during  the  transition  period.  An  brokers who are members of the
important  advantage  of a commitment  to staged  Mexican  Stock  Exchange  to
implementation  of reforms is that it will allow  minimize  regulatory  arbitrage
Mexico  to pursue the co-operation  and technical  across  borders  by  USA  and
assistance  initiatives already underway between  Canadian brokers who may face
the relevant  regulatory agencies and to add new  stricter regulation  at home.
areas as they become relevant.  In this  way
Mexico may assure itself that  its  regulatory  *  free  domestic  entry  and
regime is fully equipped to deal with the new  deregulation of brokerage fees to
entrants.  Grant  or  loan  funded  technical  allow the  maximum competitive
assistance from  the  USA  and  Canada  may  price benefit to arise from opening
further this process.  Some key regulatory  areas  the market to foreign  participation.
to be considered  include:
39VI.  TAX ISSUES
This section analyzes issues arising from  The principal conclusions reached in this
differences in  the  tax treatment of  trade  in  section  involve  recommendations for  both
financial services.  How will the existing tax  long-term  tax  reform  and  more  specific
structures in  the  three  countries affect  the  short-term tax  changes.  The  recommended
relative  competitiveness  of  financial  long-term  reforms are as follows:
intermediaries  with  different  ownership
structures?  Existing tax laws distort in many  1)  Mexico  may  consider  reducing
ways the  location of  financial activity, the  restrictions  on  the  fraction  of  foreign
pattern of ownership  of financial  firms, and their  ownership  in  firms  located  in  Mexico.
financial structure.  Each country's tax system  Foreign subsidiaries  in Mexico  qualify for a tax
can have substantial effects on  the  resulting  credit  against  their home-country  corporate  taxes
structure of  the  industry.  The  chosen tax  for any corporate taxes paid in Mexico only if
treatment for the financial sector will not only  the parent firm owns at least 10% of the voting
affect  the  relative  competitiveness  of  shares of the subsidiary.  There are further tax
domestically  owned vs. foreign firms, but will  advantages  in the home country  from having  the
also affect the cost of financial transactions  for  parent own a majority  of the shares.  Allowing
domestic residents, most importantly including  firms these tax advantages  in their home country
the cost of funds to domestic investors.  What  would increase  investment in  Mexico.  Of
beneficial tax changes can Mexico make on its  course, allowing  a higher ownership  share gives
own, taking as given the tax structures in the  foreign investors more than  just tax advantages.
other two countries?  Their incentive  to transfer technology,  or simply
invest  effort  in improving  the performance  of the
Financial institutions doing  business  in  subsidiary, depends  critically  on the share of the
Mexico in principle can be located in the US,  resulting increased  profits that they receive.
Canada,  or  other  countries,  as  well  as  in
Mexico.  US banks, for example, can accept  2) Financial services should be exempt
deposits from Mexican investors and can make  from  value-added  taxes.  At  present
loans to Mexican firms.  In addition, financial  transactions in the Mexican securities markets
institutions  located in any given country can in  pay VAT.  This tax discriminates  against this
principle  be  owned  by  investors  located  form of intermediation. In addition, a VAT on
elsewhere. Taxes can have  substantial  effects  on  financial services transacted in Mexico simply
the relative competitiveness  of firms in different  induces Mexicans to  conduct their  financial
locations, or  firms  with  owners residing in  transactions abroad.  While  in principle, this
different locations. In addition, taxes affect the  distortion  could be avoided by imposing  a VAT
prices charged for  financial services to  both  on  all  financial  transactions  conducted  by
individuals  and firms.  To what degree does the  Mexicans,  regardless  of  location,  such  a
existing  Mexican  tax system affect  the ownership  broad-based tax  would  be  administratively
structure,  location,  and  costs,  ef  financial  infeasible.
institutions,  or corporations  more broadly,  doing
business in  Mexico?  What  changes in  the  3) Requirements to invest In tax exempt
Mexican tax system might be appropriate, in  government  bonds  should  be  removed.
light of the increased international  competition  Currently insurance companies have to  invest
that will likely result from a NAFTA?  30% of their portfolio in government  tax-exempt
bonds (this requirement  has been phased out for
banks).  While  their  interest  income  is
40tax-exempt under  Mexican  law,  it  is  not  interest and overhead expenses among a parent
tax-exempt under the US or Canadian tax law,  and its branches can induce a firm to shift its
so that this provision discourages  investment  by  overhead activity  and  its  borrowing  to  its
these foreign firms in Mexico and foreigners in  branches,  thereby reducing  foreign  tax payments
domestically  issued  public debt. There are three  while leaving the  firm's  total  tax  liabilities
alternative solutions  to  this  issue.  First,  unchanged.  Mexico should try to undo these
eliminate  the tax-exempt status of government  distortions, for  example by  adopting the US
bonds.  This will increase the interest rates on  sourcing rules.
these bonds by the amount of the tax (the after
tax yields are equalized  across borders and thus  7) National tax treatment  of dividend
will  remain  unchanged, since  Mexico is  a  income.  For  firms  holding  internationally
"small" country).  This  solution would also  diversified  portfolios  of  equity,  dividends
promote pension plans  and life insurance by  received from  domestic firms  are  normally
rebating this taz on interest income earned on  exempt from tax, but dividends received from
the  assets held by  these programs, and  will  foreign firms are normally fully taxable. Given
encourage  holdings  of  domestically  issued  the  frequent  gains  from  the  international
government debt by foreigners in general and  diversification  of portfolios, this tax distortion
not only foreign owned financial  intermediaries.  penalizing  corporate holdings of foreign equity
Second,  elinminate the  30%  requirement.  may be very costly, particularly for financial
Although there is no problem for implementing  intermediaries, and requires rethinking.  One
it  immediately,  insurance  companies  (and  alternative  would  be to allow such firms a credit
financial  intermediaries  in general) would  like to  for foreign corporate taxes even when they own
maintain government bonds as a part of their  less than 10% of any given foreign firm (i.e.,
liquid portfolio.  Third,  have the previous two  granting national  tax treatment under NAFTA).
solutions simultaneously  implemented.  Another alternative, adopted by the Canadians
with respect to life insurance  companies,  would
4) Profit-sharing  payments should be  be to exempt  these firms from domestic  taxes on
tax  deductible  for  corporations.  If  their foreign  operations.
profit-sharing  payments, unlike other forms of
labor compensation,  are not tax deductible  for  8) National tax treatment  for  foreign
corporations,  then the corporate  tax discourages  life-insurance in the US.  The US has different
use  of  labor by  profitable corporations, and  tax treatment to domestic branches of foreign
more so the more profitable the corporation.  life-insurance  companies.  Canadian firms are
This provision also tends to put firms located in  also subject to this treatment in spite of national
Mexico  at a competitive  disadvantage.  treatment under the US-Canada  FTA.  In order
to prevent such companies from shifting their
5)  Adopt  better  tax  policies  for  taxable income abroad, the US government  has
Insurance companies.  Contributions  to build  set their minimum  net investment  income equal
up  precautionary reserves should not be  tax  to  the  product of  their  required US  assets
deductible. On the other hand, the yield of the  multiplied by the  domestic investment yield.
technical  reserves  from  life  and  disability  Since other insurance firms operating in the US
insurance  policies should be tax exempt  to avoid  do not face this restriction,  they may be put at a
double  taxation  of  saving  (i.e.,  ensure  competitive  advantage.
consumption tax  treatment for  this  form  of
contractual  savings instrument).  9) Allow loss-offset  provision  to holding
companies. If firms are likely to end up with
6)  Harmonize  sourcing  rules  for  unused  tax losses,  then they have an incentive  to
income/deductions. The US rules for allocating  engage in potentially costly rearrangements  of
41their  financial  portfolios or  their  form  of  annual minimum  salary. Unless the tax sharing
ownership in order to  make use of these tax  information  is capable  of detecting  cross-border
losses.  Also, it discourages financial holding  arbitrage  transactions,  this  could  result  in
companies, thereby preventing the exploitation  considerable revenue losses for  the  Mexican
of economies of scope derived from universal  Treasury.
banking practices.  These distortions  should be
avoided, either by allowing  groups of firms with  Group insurance  should lead to the same
common ownership to  file  consolidated tax  tax treatment of final beneficiaries  as individual
returns,  or  by  indexing carry-overs by  the  insurance  does, that is, if workers are not taxed
nominal interest rate.  on the basis of the premiums  paid by firms on
their behalf, they should be taxed on the basis of
10)  Correct  loophole  in personal income  the  benefits  they  receive  (i.e.,  insurance
tax  treatment of  group insurance.  Group  payments).
insurance premiums are tax deductible if such
insurance  is regarded by the tax law as a fringe
benefit for  employees.  A  loophole arises,
however, since  the premium is  not part  of
workers'  taxable income, and  the  insurance
payments are untaxed up to nine times the
42VII.  SUMMARY  AND CONCLUSIONS
In summary, to maximize the efficiency  intermediaries  and cooperation among national
gains from liberalization  of the financial  sector,  tax administrations.
the  regulatory  environment  of  banking,
insurance, and securities markets can be further  In banking the issues  are the convergence
reformed  through  deregulation  and  better  of  general criteria  for  authorizing firms  to
defining  and  implementing  prudential  engage  in banking  business  and to remove many
supervision.  Harmonization  of regulatory and  of the obstacles to  freedom of  establishment.
supervisory  rules is a key issue in liberalization.  Other provisions  may prove useful in the present
An integrated market will presuppose greater  phase of integration, such as the creation of a
cooperation  and exchange  of information  among  Banking Advisory Committee to assist in  the
the respective regulatory authorities to  ensure  preparation of  banking measures aiming  at
that  individual insurers  are  prevented from  greater  convergence  in  regulations  and
exploiting loopholes in  prudential regulations  supervision.
and engaging  in deceptive  and unsound  business
practices.  Discrepancies between  different  There  is  the  issue of  branching and
financial  institution  regulations  should  be  interstate  banking,  i.e.,  the  territorial
eliminated  so as to create a level playing field  segmentation  of the market.  Because  of the US
for  all  participants,  domestic  as  well  as  restrictions on interstate banking Mexico may
international,  between member countries.  For  have to enter into separate arrangements  with
each  subsector,  establishing  an  effective  each state.
supervisory  system is crucial and will determine
the  pace  of  liberalization.  International  Strengthening  supervision  still remains a
cooperation between regulators and examiners  priority issue.  This is especially  true since the
should be  ensured.  Improving transparency  banking system  is  being  newly  privatized.
through greater disclosure is very important in  Given  that  the privatization price  for  some
enforcing regulations and  establishing market  Mexican  banks was much  higher than  their book
discipline. Finally, guarantee  funds  should  have  value of  capital, these banks will be  under
well-defined objectives and  powers to  avoid  additional pressure to  recoup their  expenses
moral hazard problems.  before their protection  is phased out.
In addition to harmonizing  regulation  and  Also, the issue of harmonizing deposit
supervision,  eliminating  or  reducing  the  guarantee  schemes  deserves  considerable
disparities  between  NAFTA  countries  in both tax  analysis. The Mexican  deposit  insurance  system
rates and the way taxes are levied would help  should have very well-defined  powers and its
prevent  distortions,  tax  evasion  and  tax  purpose  should  be  to  protect  small,
avoidance linked to  the diversity of  national  unsophisticated  investors  rather  than  mismanaged
systems. Although  the harmonization  of taxation  institutions.
of  income from capital may not be a legally
binding prerequisite for  full capital mobility,  Turning  from  the  legislative  to  the
proposals  designed  to eliminate  these distortions  executive aspect of supervision, it should be
should also be evaluated. Related  issues  are the  emphasized  that the FTA design will not foresee
development of  a  common system  for  the  a central  body with responsibility  for the day-to-
transmission  of information  to tax authorities  by  day supervision  of banks: this function will be
left  to  the  authorities of  individual member
43countries.  Bilateral contacts between national  would  involve primarily  issues  of  investor
authorities  should  be  encouraged  and  protection  rather than prudential concerns.
strengthened in dealing with individual cases.
But  there will clearly also  be  a  need for  a  A second set of more general problems
permanent  forum  for  the  coordination of  concerns  the  importance the  rules  should
practices and policies among ali the national  attribute, in promoting  the supply of services in
authorities  with  banking  supervision  a regime of mutual recognition, to whether or
responsibilities.  not investment  firms are part of an organized
market. Finally, minimum  capital requirements
In insurance, convergence  in regulations  and  the  regulation of  market risks  (chiefly,
and  supervision is  again  the  central  issue.  interest rate and exchange  rate risk) will have to
Consideration should be given to the case for  achieve  equality  of treatment and neutrality  with
organizing joint training programs to  enhance  respect to both credit institutions  and investment
staff expertise  and achieve  greater consistency  in  firms.
regulatory approach.
The issue is whether  the aim of NAFTA
In Mexico  cross-border  insurance  business  is to develop a truly unified capital market by
is  relatively  less  developed  but  foreign  both increasing  transparency  and ensuring  access
participation in  local establishments is  more  fcr  issuers to  stock exchanges throughout the
developed.  However,  domestic  entry  is  area.  If so, there will be a need to harmonize
restricted and the establishment  of fully-owned  the  rules  on  listing  particulars,  on  the
foreign subsidiaries is not allowed.  A more  information  to be published  on a regular basis by
liberal  entry  policy  for  both  domestic and  listed  companies, on  the  information to  be
foreign-owned  institutions  is necessary. Mexico  published  when major holdings are acquired in
also needs to remove any biases that exist in  a listed company, on the mutual recognition  of
favor of domestic  reinsurance.  listing particulars, on  the  prospectus to  be
published when transferable securities are first
Also to safeguard the interests of small  offered to the public, on rules and procedures
policyholders  and  protect  the  competitive  for takeover bids, and on inside  trading. On the
position of the Mexican market, consideration  last  one,  the  rules  should  define  inside
should be  given to  the case for  establishing  information,  identify the persons with access to
limited  guarantee  funds.  such information  and establish  their obligations.
In securities markets  there will also be a  In conclusion,  implementation  of NAFTA
need  to  harmonize  essential  prudential  will pose a  major challenge to  the Mexican
regulations.  NAFTA will have to pursue an  financial system and the Mexican supervisory
appropriate  balance  between  investor  protection,  authorities  to  modernize  their  operations,
market efficiency and the  regulation of  risk  enhance their efficiency and strengthen their
management.  effectiveness. In some areas, there will be a
strong  need  for  intensive  training  and
A  first  set  of  problems concerns the  cooperation  with the regulatory authorities of
internal rules that investment  firms will need to  Canada and the United States. The inclusion  in
adopt  on prudential  grounds and with the aim of  NAFTA  of a reasonable  transition  period, which
minimizing  conflicts  of interest. One possibility  extends up  to  the  year  2000,  provides  a
that could  be considered  is mutual  recognition  of  reassurance  that Mexican  institutions  will be able
home-country  disclosure  requirements.  to  rise  to  the  challenge  and  achieve  the
Moreover,  any  agreements in  this  area,  in  efficiency  gains that have  motivated  the quest for
contrast to  banking and  investment services,  the agreement  in the first place.
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46APPENDIX  A
TREATMENT  OF FINANCIAL  SERVICES  IN FREE TRADE  NEGOTIATIONS
This appendix reviews the treatment of  payments. But there is also agreement  that the
financial  services in the GATT negotiations,  the  scope for cross-border  transactions is limited to
European Community single market,  and the  large corporations and wealthy individuals  who
US-Canada  free trade agreement.  can  overcome  the  high  information  and
transaction costs of obtaining financial services
Financial  Services in the GAIT Negotiations  from institutions  established  in foreign  countries.
However, some cross-border services, such as
Financial services are one of the most  marine insurance. reinsurance, and  financial
controversial  sectors in the GATT negotiations  advisory  services,  are suitable  for inclusion  in an
regarding the liberalization  of trade in services.  agreement  on multilateral  liberalization.
There are two main reasons for this.  First,
there are very large differences in the level of  The discussion of modes of delivery is
development,  efficiency  and sophistication  of the  focussed  on the local commercial  presence and
financial systems of different countries.  And,  the right of establishment  of foreign institutions.
second,  there  are  substantial differences  in  On this issue, a  distinction is drawn between
financial structure  and  practice  that  reflect  market access and national treatment.  Market
different philosophies about the role of banks  access refers to the right of local commercial
and other financial  institutions,  their permissible  presence which can take many different forms
scope of  activities and their links with other  such as a local branch, local subsidiary, joint
financial  institutions  and  nonfinancial  venture, minority participation  or acquisition  of
corporations.  local institution. There is general agreement  that
market  access  will  not  be  an  automatic
The GATT negotiations  aim to establish  obligation  under the framework agreement, but
a framework  of principles and rules that should  there is considerable  debate on whether  it should
govern the liberalization of trade in services.  be a general obligation  against which countries
The main issues under discussion include: the  have the right to enter reservations  or whether  it
modes of  delivery of  financial services (i.e.  should be treated as a qualified right under the
through cross-border transactions or  through  framework  that would be granted only through
local  commercial presence);  market  access;  negotiations and an  exchange of  concessions.
reciprocity;  national  treatment;  equality  of  Moreover, there is some debate as to whether
competitive  opportunity; the right to regulate; 38 some forms of  market access (such as local
the  transparency of  regulations; the pace of  branch  or acquisition  of local institution)  may be
liberalization;  the resolution  of disputes;  and the  subject to  tighter  restrictions to  ensure that
question  of cross-linkage.  domestic  control is maintained  over the core of
the banking and financial  system.  Linked with
As  regards  modes  of  delivery,  the  the issue of market access is the question of
prevailing  view is that cross-border  transactions  temporary entry of essential foreign personnel.
raise complex issues in  connection with  the  There  is  general  agreement that  entry  of
liberalization of  capital and foreign exchange  essential personnel is  necessary but  opinions
controls.  There  is  concern that liberalizing  differ on how "essential" personnel should be
cross-border  services might hamper the stability  defined.
of developing countries' financial systems and
have adverse implications for the balance of
47Historically,  DFI in financial  services  has  for  foreign  financial  institutions in  a  host
been permitted either on a unilateral basis or  country.  In  general,  a  policy  of  national
through reciprocity.  Reciprocity can involve  treatment is the US policy toward foreign  banks
unduly tight restrictions on the operations of  and other DFI in the US.  The overall US policy
foreign  institutions.  These  may  affect the  of national treatment is based on the belief that
number of foreign institutions that are granted  open and competitive  markets facilitate a more
market access, their individual  or total share of  efficient, a more innovative  and dynamic, and a
domestic business, and their range of activities.  more financially  sound banking  system.
A  particularly restrictive type  of  reciprocal
arrangements is the so-called "mirror image"  Use of  a  financial service reciprocity
reciprocity. This implies  that foreign  institutions  concept as  a  bargaining tool  in  the  general
are allowed to engage in identical activities in  context of trade negotiations  could also create
two  or  more  countries,  irrespective of  the  problems  because  of differences  between  trade in
permissible  range  of  activities  of  national  financial  services  and trade in other services  and
institutions  in each market.  goods. As has been emphasized  above, financial
services involve issues  of prudential  regulation,
Because  of the highly uncertain  outcome,  monetary policy,  and  stability  of  financial
a strategy based on the use of reciprocity as a  markets.  Thus it  may be  inappropriate for
bargaining tool  could be  very  risky.  If  a  financial  services  to  be  the  subject  of
reciprocity  policy is in fact used to bar entry by  "recipcocal" concessions  for  goods  or  for
some foreign financial institutions,  the ultimate  nonfinancial  services  in  a  global  trade
effect of the policy could  be to close rather than  negotiation  context.  Moreover,  it  is
to open markets.  Moreover, if any reciprocity  conceptually  and practically  difficult  to measure
policy is adopted and a review procedure is set  trade in financial  services in a meaningful  way.
up,  a  bureaucratic structure will have been  In part to avoid these kinds of trade-offs and
created  that, once in place, has the potential  for  measurement  issues,  the US Treasury  has always
being  used in an increasingly  restrictive  manner.  urged that trade in financial services  be viewed
in terms of equality  of competitive  opportunity
A reciprocity policy, depending on  its  in a national market for foreign and domestic
definition  and implementation,  could result in a  financial  institutions,  that is, in terms of national
complex regulatory structure for operations of  treatment.
banks from different countries  outside  the FTA.
Such  a structure could  involve  discrimination  not  Because of  the  restrictive  effects  of
only between foreign and FTA members-owned  reciprocal  agreements  and  the  danger  of
financial institutions but  also  among foreign  retaliatory action in response to grievances and
financial institutions from different countries.  disputes,  there is now widespread  consensus  that
Moreover, a reciprocity  review procedure  could  once market access is granted, the principle of
delay applications by  non-members banks to  national  treatment  should  apply, whereby  foreign
establish or  acquire  banks  within the  FTA  institutions receive  the  same  treatment  as
countries.  Such delays could be particularly  domestic  institutions  in  like  circumstances.
burdensome  if reciprocity  were to be determined  There  is  some  uncertainty as  to  the  exact
on  a  case-by-case basis  rather  than  by  an  meaning  of the term "like circumstances"  as well
established  rule for each non-member  country.  as to the implications  of the principle  of national
treatment for different modes of delivery, and
Insisting on a reciprocity policy will not  especially for  local  subsidiaries  and  local
earn  the  support  of  the  US,  since  it  will  branches.  Under national treatment, a  local
undermine  its  efforts  pursued  in  various  subsidiary  of a foreign institution  should  receive
international  fora to achieve national treatment  identical  treatment as a domestic institution  but
48in the case of local branches, national  treatment  foreign  participation,  including participation
may confer regulatory advantages to  foreign  from other subdivisions,  national  treatment may
institutions.  The  principle  of  equivalent  impose considerable  limits on market access on
treatment  may then be applied, whereby foreign  foreign institutions.2 9 In addition, restrictions
branches may be  treated less favorably than  at the level of political subdivisions  may even
domestic branches but the effect would be to  deny national  treatment to foreign institutions.
achieve equivalent treatment between domestic
institutions  and the local operations  of a branch  Effective market access (which the EC
of a foreign institution.  sometimes  refers to as the "broad definition  of
national treatment") appears to encompass  two
There  is  also  considerable  debate  different  concepts:  national  treatment  and
tegarding the concepts of dejure  and defacto  "progressive  liberalization"  of  laws  and
natioinal  treatment. Defacto  national  treatment  regulations  relating  to  banking  and  other
is associated with the concept of  equality of  financial services.  In  other words, national
competitive  opportunity. The latter refers to the  treatment in the context of a restrictive, highly
prevention of various practices and regulations  regulated  banking  system  might  not  be
that have the effect of discriminating against  considered  to provide effective market access.
foreign institutions.  Thus, de facto  national  The concept of effective  market access appears
treatment  and  equality  of  competitive  to be based on the arguments  that (a) a highly
opportunity imply that foreign institutions are  regulated  host-country  environment  may have a
not  impeded by  regulations or  the  use  of  differential impact on  foreign  and  domestic
discretionary  authorizations  from obtaining  local  institutions  and (b) host-country  treatment may
currency funding from the money and capital  be  so  restrictive  in  comparison  with  the
markets, having equal access to refinancing  and  regulatory framework for banking services in
other central bank facilities, and participating  in  other countries,  that market distortion  is created.
preferential  domestic  credit  programs.  A
sharper interpretation  of the principle  of equality  The first argument  implies  that in a highly
of competitive  opportunity  requires that foreign  regulated environment  it is much more difficult
institutions  should  not  be  prevented  from  to achieve  national  treatment  for foreign  banking
introducing new  instruments or  services by  organizations  than it is to achieve  such treatment
delays  in  authorization  procedures  that  in  a  more open  system.  But  it  does  not
discriminate  in favor of domestic institutions.  necessarily  follow that is impossible  to achieve
national  treatment  under such circumstances. If,
The principle  of national  treatment  is part  however, it is assumed that national treatment
of  the  non-discrimination principle of  trade  cannot be defined or achieved in a  restrictive
negotiations  that covers both the "most favored  environment, liberalization of  the  regulatory
nation (MFN)" clause and national treatment.  structure is  necessary to  achieve meaningful
MFN requires that  imports from  all sources  access  to domestic markets.
should face identical barriers, while national
treatment requires that, once through customs,  The second argument, because it is based
foreign goods should not be subject to taxes and  on  a  more global comparison of  regulatory
regulations  that are more onerous than those on  structures,  raises the issue of harmonization. At
equivalent  domestic goods.  But with regard to  least for the industrial countries, "progressive
DFI  in  financial services, application of  the  liberalization" could be viewed as a somewhat
national treatment principle is complicated  by  less formal and less structured GATT  equivalent
the role of political subdivisions in regulating  of  one  aspect  of  the  EC  process  of
financial institutions.  In those countries  where  harmonization  of essential  laws, regulations,  and
political  subdivisions impose restrictions on  practices. Because  the degree  of liberalization  is
49measured against that existing in other major  progressive liberalization.  The pace  should
industrial  countries,  trying  to  achieve  depend on  progress made  in  implementing
progressive  liberalization in  countries  with  domestic financial reform  and  deregulation,
restrictive structures amounts to an attempt to  restructuring  domestic  institutions  and
bring  those  structures into rough conformity  modernizing  their operations,  and strengthening
with  the  more  liberal  structures  in  other  national regulatory and supervisory agencies.
countries.  The pace of liberalization is relevant not only
with regard  to the question  of market access and
The next issue in the GATI negotiations  the allowable mode of delivery, but also with
concerns  the  right  to  regulate  and  the  regard  to  the  permissible new  instruments.
transparency of regulations.  There is general  Authorization  of new financial instruments  and
agreement that  the  liberalization of  trade  in  services  must  be  linked  to  the  ability  of
services  should not put into question  the right of  regulators to assess their implications for the
national authorities to  regulate the  financial  stability of  the  financial system and  control
system for prudential  and other purposes. There  possible abuses  that might negate their benefits.
is a legitimate need to  ensure the safety and  New  products  need  to  be  monitored  and
soundness  of  financial  institutions and  the  supervised  to ensure  the protection  of depositors,
stability  of the financial  system, to maintain  fair  policy holders and investors.
and orderly market conditions,  to preserve the
integrity  of the national  payment system and to  Two  additional issues  in  the  GATr
protect the interests  of consumers  and investors.  negotiations  are the establishment  of an effective
Moreover,  there  is  widespread  concern,  mechanism  for the resolutioii  of disputes  and the
especially among developing countries,  that  question of  cross-linkage between  different
liberalization  of trade in financial  services  should  sectors.  These two issues are interrelated  since
not  prevent developing countries from using  if there is cross-linkage,  countries may threaten
their  banking  systems  to  promote  natioii,"'  to  retaliate in  the financial services area  for
development objectives and should not leave  disputes arising in a nonfinancial  sector.  It is
them with inadequate  powers to control money  generally agreed that financial markets should
and credit growth and foreign exchange  flows.  not be exposed  to such de-stabilizing  threats but
it is rather difficult  to avoid any cross-linkage.
Although the right to regulate is widely  Establishing an  effective  dispute  resolution
accepted, strong emphasis  is placed on the need  mechanism  is also a very sensitive  issue  because
for  regulations to  be  transparent  and  non-  disputes  in  the  financial services area  may
discriminatory  against  foreign  .nstitutions.  challenge  the transparency  of regulations  and the
Regulations should  be  taken  for  legitimate  discretionary  powers of national authorities.
reasons and not for the purpose  of circumventing
a liberalization  agreement. However,  the broad  In a world of complete  convergence,  the
scope of regulations,  the legitimate  concerns  of  policies  of national  treatment, reciprocal  national
many countries to  maintain domestic control  treatment,  mirror-image  reciprocity,  and
over the core of their banking and financial  effective  market access  would produce identical
system, and the difficulty of devising effective  results.  Pending such convergence, however,
settlement dispute procedures would make a  the differences among these concepts are still
universally acceptable multilateral agreement  important.  And some of  the  most difficuit
rather difficult  to reach.  problems  are presented  by the lack of agreement
among the major industrial countries regarding
A crucial issue in the GATT negotiations  the permissible  activities  of banks, in particular,
concerns the pace of liberalization.  There is  whether  to separate commercial  and investment
widespread agreement in favor of gradual or  banking.
50In the banking, investment  services, and  The EC base the completion  of integration
insurance  sectors,  national  treatment,  as  on the principle  of mutual recognition, whereby
embodied in the OECD Codes of Liberalization  each member state recognizes  the validity  of the
and the National Treatment Instrument, is in  laws and regulations in  force in  each of the
general  the  currently  accepted  approach.  other, and agrees not to exploit the differences
Whether national treatment or effective  market  between  regulatory  systems  to  protect  its
access might become the accepted approach if  national market.  The traditional approach, by
any agreement is reached on trade in financial  contrast,  saw  integration as  involving the
services  in connection  with the current Uruguay  detailed harmonization  of the entire corpus of
Round of  GATT negotiations remains to  be  laws and regulations  applicable  to each sector.
seen.
The  principle  of  mutual  recognition
To sum up this brief review of the GATT  implies that  every member countries sets of
negotiations,  financial  services  raise  many  national  rules,  which  differ  in  significant
difficult and sensitive issues and it is unclear  respects, will all be in force and co-exist in the
whether they will be included in any agreement  same 'arge market.  This is bound to trigger
that might eventually  result from this round of  arbitrage.  Thus, the convergence of national
negotiations. In fact, there are many officials  regulatory systems, which would have  been
and  practitioners who express the  view that  reached through the  traditional approach of
financial services should  be  the  subject of  complete top-down harmonization, should be
separate  negotiations  and should not be part of a  brought about by market forces instead  or, to be
general  agreement  on  trade  and  services.  more precise, by the interaction  between  market
However, it  is  now too late  to  change this  forces and national  regulators.
approach without undermining the momentum
for agreeing a general framework for trade in  In  principle,  the  outcome  will  not
services.  necessarily  be  complete  convergence since
different market segments may place differenm
Financial  Services  in  the  European  values on  regulatory standards and  product
Community Single Market  prices.  In the financial sphere, for instance,
some customers  may be ready to pay more for
The proposals  for the creation  of a single  the services  of an intermediary  that is subject to
market in financial services in the EC is based  the stricter prudential controls of a  particular
on  the  three  principles  of  home  country  member  state. However,  the internationalization
authorization  and control, mutual recognition  of  of financial services is already creating market
national  supervisory  authorities  and  an  pressure for greater convergence  of prudential
approximation of  rules  and  regulations that  standards  on a  world wide basis.  A single
include such items as the permissible range of  market may accelerate  this process further.
activities  (a universal  financial  services  approach
has been adopted)  and solvency  controls.  The danger  inherent  in mutual recognition
is that relying exclusively  on market forces to
The approach  of the EC differs from that  determine regulatory standards may lead to a
of  traditional bilateral and multilateral FTAs  sub-optimal  outcome,  with  excessive  or
because  it envisages  a progressive  economic  and,  inappropriate  deregulation. This is why, both
ultimately  even political, integration  of member  on financial services, the principle of  mutual
countries  with the ultimate objective  of creating  recognition has  been  tempered by  that  of
institutions  with  EC-wide  operations  and  minimal  harmonization.  To  avoid  leap-
ownership.  frogging by member states seeking to offer the
most favorable regulatory conditions, the EC
5'should  make  the  application  of  mutual  member  countries  with no discrimination  against
recognition conditional on the introduction of  nationals  of other member countries.
common regulations to  safeguard fundamental
public interests.  Financial Services in the US-Canada  FTA
The crucial question is, of course, how  The US-Canada  FTA went into effect in
"minimal"  minimal  harmonization  can be while  January 1989.  It is based on the principles of
still ensuring an acceptable  level of regulatory  national treatment,  the  right  to  sell  across
standards. In the financial  sector, the definition  borders,  the  right  of  establishment,  and
of what is necessary to harmonize  has already  transparency in  regulations.  The US-Canada
been found not to be a once-and-for-all  process.  FTA contains  a unapter on services that grants
On  the  contrary,  it  calls  for  continuous  national treatment to  insurance companies but
evaluation  and is likely to require more common  banking is covered in a separate chapter that
legislation  than originally  thought.  does not grant national  treatment to banks from
the two countries.  It does not cover securities
In the financial field, a corollary of the  markets per  se.  However,  the  agreement
two key principles of mutual recognition and  removes several restrictions on market access
minimal  harmonization  is the principle  of home-  and scope of operations, e.g.  expands  the scope
country control,  which  assigns supervisory  of banking  into securities  transactions.
responsibility  to the authorities  of the member
state  in  which  the  financial institution was  National treatment assures  that any new
originally authorized  to operate.  An important  Canadian (US) law or regulation must treat US
aspect of home country control is how deposits  (Canadian) financial service providers no less
of branches overseas are protected. In the EC  favorably than Canadian  (US) providers.  This
countries, they  are  covered by  the  national  will provide stability and predictability  for US
deposit protection  system of the home country.  (Canadian) businesses in  thd  Canadian (US)
market.
However,  despite the  objectives of  a
single market and even economic  and political  However, this does not mean that Canada
integration (which,  if  implemented, should  and the US must always  give identical  treatment.
remove concerns about national ownership of  Differential  treatment  may  occur  between
financial  institutions),  there  is  currently  domestic and  foreign  service  providers  for
considerable apprehension in  some countries  prudential, fiduciary, consumer protection, or
about the  likelihood of  national institutions  other valid reasons.
coming under the control of institutions from
other member countries. At present,  the right of  For example, with respect to insurance,
regulatory authorities to  approve controlling  new provincial (state) requirements which are
stakes in individual  institutions,  coupled  with the  higher for a  foreign insurer than a  domestic
widely dispersed ownership  of most institutions  insurer in Canada  (US) would not necessarily  be
of national  importance,  allows  member  countries  inconsistent with  the  FTA.  However,  any
to influence  the ownership of national  financial  differences in treatment must not be disguised
institutions.  Member  countries  can  still  barriers to trade and must be justifiable.
introduce regulations similar to  those used in
Canada, whereby  no individual  shareholdings  of  The  FTA  assures  US  and  Canadian
large banks are allowed  to exceed 10% of share  service providers of the right to sell across the
capital. However, any such requirements  would  border.  This  is important when it  is  more
have to grant equal treatment to all citizens of  economical  for a business  to provide the service
from the home-country, rather than establish
52itself  in  the  host-country.  This  right  is  and regulations  relating  to services  trade so that
especially important  for many high-technology  persons and firms who may be affected  will  have
services,  such as credit reporting  services, where  an  opportunity to  make their  views known.
the normal means  of delivery is over telephone  Transparency also  includes clear  criteria  in
lines to all customers  from one central  computer  exercising  discretionary  powers.  Such
installation. Conversely,  when a local presence  transparency  will  enable  US  (Canadian)
is the preferred (or only) method to provide a  services providers to participate with Canadian
service in the host-country,  the FTA guarantees  (US)  firms in  the  Canadian (US) regulating
the right of establishment.  process. It is essential  to know the rules of the
game.
The two countries have agreed to make
publicly available  (to make  transparent)  all laws
53APPENDIX B
Financial Services In the Proposed  NAFrA
This  appendix  summarizes the  main  In  the insurance  sector, the  aggregate
provisions regarding financial services in the  limit will rise from 6%  in  1994 to  12% by
proposed NAFTA  that was signed in December  1999.  The single-institution  market limit will
1992  and, subject  to the completion  of domestic  remain 1.5% throughout the transition period.
approval procedures, will enter into force on  US and Canadian  insurance  companies  that enter
January 1, 1994.  into joint ventures with Mexican firms will be
permitted  to expand  their equity  participation  on
Each  NAFTA  country  must  grant  an accelerated  schedule, reaching 51% in 1998
"national  treatment" and "most-favored-nation"  and  100%  in  2000.  Moreover,  these
treatment to  participants from other NAFTA  investments will  not  be  subject  to  either
countries.  Market  access  is  limited  to  individual  or aggregate  limits.
individuals  or companies  that already engage in
their country of origin in financial services.  It  The provision of  cross-border financial
may also be limited to subsidiaries  rather than  services  includes  both  the  concept  of  the
direct branches.  "mobility  of provider" and the concept of the
"mobility  of consumer". Each NAFTA country
Mexico is allowed to impose on US and  must  permit its citizens  and residents  to purchase
Canadian participants individual and aggregate  financial  services  from providers located  in other
market share limits.  These will be stated as a  NAFTA  countries.  Except  for  insurance
proportion  of the total capital in each sector and  companies,  Mexico may require that a Mexican
will be phased out by the year 2000. The whole  subsidiary  must be wholly owned by the US or
issue will, however, be  revisited if  US  and  Canadian parent institution.  Mexico may also
Canadian  participants  acquire  a combined  market  deny  access to  Canadian or  US  banks  or
share in excess of 25%.  securities  firms that are affiliated  with industrial
or commercial  corporations.
In banking, the aggregate  limit will rise
from 8% in 1994  to 15% by 1999. The single-  There  are  various  provisions for  the
institution limit will be  1.5% throughout the  creation of limited-scope financial institutions
transition period.  Both during and after the  that would be subject to  less onerous capital
transition  period, acquisitions  of Mexican  banks  requirements and less restrictive market share
will be subject to an individual,  per institution  limits. Warehousing,  bonding, foreign  exchange
limit of 4%.  and mutual  fund management  will not be subject
to market share limitations.
In the securities industry, the aggregate
limit will increase from 10% in 1994  to 20% by  The  right  to  provide  new  financial
1999.  The single-institution  limit will be 4%  services and to  transfer information for  data
throughout the transition period.  Within two  processing is  also  covered  in  the  proposed
years of entry into force, Mexico will decide  agreement. No requirement  to employ  nationals
whether to authorize  new types of limited-scope  in key positions will be allowed.
securities firms that would be subject to lower
capital requirements.  Finally, the proposed NAFTA does not
constrain the right of each country to impose
regulatory  or restrictive  measures  for prudential
S4reasons,  in  pursuit  of  monetary,  credit  or
exchange rate policies, for balance of payments
reasons  or  for  taxation and  social  security
purposes.
55NOTES
1.  This paper is based on a report produced by a World Bank mission to
Mexico in which Roger Gordon and Robert Pardy also participated.  The report
was completed in March 1991.  The paper includes a limited amount of updating,
mainly to note some main recent developments in financial regulation.
2.  This follows the free trade agreement between Canada and the U.S. that
has already been in place for a number of years.
3.  To give an overall quantitative perspective, the average price reduction
in the cost of financial services for the EC as a whole was estimated, in a
study conducted by Price Waterhouse, at 0.7% of GDP (1.5% for Spain alone).
4.  In the EC, excluding interest payments or capital raised, credit and
insurance services accounted in total for about 6% of intermediate inputs into
industry.
5.  Some of these arguments may explain, for example, the co-existence of
small and large intermediaries in California, New York and other states with
state-wide branching.
6.  Before the new law, insurance companies were allowed 49% foreign
ownership.  These companies are now grandfathered.
7.  To some extent this attitude may be explained by the fact that these
sectors provide services to the majority of the local population and generate
little foreign exchange earnings.  It is worth noting that DFI in the hotel
industry, which deals with foreign tourists, has been positively encouraged,
in part, because it contributes to improve the current account of the balance
of payments.
8.  For a review of Canadian developments, see Friedman (1992).
9.  For an official study supporting the proposed reforms, see U.S. Treasury
(1991).
10.  A succinct review of bank privatization in Mexico is provided in Barnes
(1992).
11.  For a review of bank structure in Canada see Kryzanowski and Roberts
(1990).
12.  For empirical tests of competition in Canadian banking see Nathan and
Neave (1989) and Shaffer (1990).
13.  Low initial capital requirements in small cities is one of the causes
for the large number of commercial banks in the United States.  There is now
growing consensus that the fragmentation of the banking industry may have
contributed to the widespread problems of nonperforming loans and insolvency
that have afflicted the US banking system in recent years.
14.  Allowing less than 10% equity holdings per foreign entity raises some
tax issues (discussed in Section 6) so that consideration should be given to
increasing the limit to 10% for all foreign participations.
5615.  The OCC is responsible for approving changes in control of national
banks, the Federal Reserve Board for bank holding companies and state-
chartered member banks, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
for insured state-chartered banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve
System.
16.  See Appendix for a discussion of financial integration under the Canada-
US FTA.
17.  The distorted incentive effects of mispriced insurance schemes are
widely discussed in the literature.  See, for example Kareken and Wallace
(1978), Sharpe (1978), Pyle (1983, 1984), and Kane (1985, 1989).
18.  See Kaminow  (1977) and Kanatas and Greenbaum (1982).
19.  This section draws on Kane (1989),  which contains a detailed discussion
of the incentive structure of the US deposit-institution regulators and a
reform proposal.
20.  For a detailed discussion of these issues, see Vittas  (1991).
21.  A main reason for the lack of comparable data is the impact of the very
high rates of inflation that prevailed in the mid-1980s.  These led among
other things to the introduction of new products that evaded the restrictive
banking regulations but created difficult accounting issues.
22.  Indeed, the Wall Street Journal reported that "privatized Mexican banks
found many undisclosed problem loans" (5/15/1992).
23.  This limit was set for a couple of years at 49%.  These companies are
now grandfathered.
24.  OECD (1991).
25.  The ten largest US companies account for almost 40% of premiums in the
life sector and for nearly 50% in nonlife business.  In Canada (as in most
European countries) the concentration ratio of the largest ten companies is
well over 55% in life and, with few exceptions, less than 50% in nonlife
insurance (Economist, 1990).
26.  Comments made at a meeting of the International Insurance Council in New
York on February 28, 1991 to review insurance developments in Latin American
countries.
27.  Premium regulation in the United States used to emphasize minimum
tariffs to prevent deceptive policies and insolvencies.  But since the mid-
1970s, regulators have allowed greater price competition among insurance
companies.  In recent years, regulators in several states have shown
increasing concern about "excessive" increases in premiums.  For an excellent
review of insurance regulation in the United States, see Meier (1988).
28.  Proposition 103 was voted by Californian residents in November 1988.  It
mandated a rollback of 20% in most property and casualty rates, including
motor insurance, and established tougher rules for rate setting.  However, the
impact of Proposition 103 has been watered down by court decisions, following
appeals by insurance companies.
29.  Market estimates quoted in Economist (1990).
5730.  See Joskow  (1973).
31.  World Bank (1990).
32.  For US property ard casualty companies, loss reserves increased from 30%
of equity in 1940 to almost 180% of equity in 1988 (Bath, 1990).
33.  The expense ratio is not expressed in this paper as a percentage of
direct premiums (as is the customary practice) but as a percentage of earned
premiums.  This tends to overstate the ratio because earned premiums are equal
to direct premiums less net premiums ceded to reinsurance less transfers to
unearned premium reserves.  The overstatement is greater, the larger the net
reinsurance ceded and the lower the retention ratio.
34.  These ratios are unweighted averages of annual ratios and differ
slightly from those published in Best Aggregates and Averages.
35.  The high level of the ratio may be explained by the use of earned
premiums as the denominator.  Expressed as percentage of direct premiums, the
expense ratio was 33.4%.
36.  OECD (1991).
37.  In addition, mutual recognition of home-country disclosure requirements
has been the basis of discussions among the US, Canada, and the UK for several
years.
38.  It includes prudential regulation and supervision.
39.  In this respect, it is somewhat ironic that liberalization in
international trade and DFI in financial services is actively promoted, while
restrictions continue to be applied on domestic trade and direct investment
between political subdivisions of individual countries.  One would have
thought that gains in efficiency and welfare would be as likely to result from
freer international trade as from freer domestic trade.
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